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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent litigation and scholarship have begun to focus on the sub-
stantive limits of the state's power to use civil commitment as a social
control tool. Courts and commentators describe civil commitment as
grounded on two powers of the state: the parens patriae interest and
the police power. This Article seeks an analytical framework for defin-
ing the boundaries of police power commitments in which justification
rests on the interests of the public rather than on the interests of the
committed individual.
The state's general power to use civil commitment commonly is de-
scribed as limited to individuals who have a mental disorder and who
are dangerous to others or themselves.1 The debate about the scope of
civil commitment is often posed as a problem of defining the kind of
mental disorder that is required to justify commitment. This question
has proven much more intractable in the police power context than
the analogous question in the parens patriae commitment context.
The parens patriae interest is the state's power (and obligation) to care
for those who are unable to care for themselves.2 Parens patriae com-
1. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354(1983); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1978).
2. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1978); Jarvis v. Levine, 418
N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988). See generally Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the
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mitments are limited to persons with mental disorders that impair
their ability to make decisions about their own lives and medical
treatment.3
The boundaries of police power commitments, however, are more
difficult to ascertain. The police power gives the state the right to pro-
tect the health and safety of the public.4 Unlike the parens patriae
interest, the police power is defined not explicitly in terms of the per-
son's mental incapacity, but rather in terms of the danger the person
poses to the community. Indeed, the police power clearly operates in
circumstances, such as the criminal law, where there is no mental im-
pairment. Thus, the limits on police power commitments and the role
mental disorder plays in defining those limits are much more obscure.
Recently, two important scholarly articles contributed to defining
these limits.5 Writing in the inaugural issue of Psychology, Public
Policy, and Law, Professor Robert Schopp's analysis argues that the
bounds of police power commitments are to be found in the respect due
to individuals who have the mental competency to act autonomously
and to be held responsible for their choices.6 Deploying massive be-
havioral science authority, Professor Bruce Winick argues that com-
mitments are limited both to mental disorders that severely impair
cognition or volition and, by the principle of "therapeutic appropriate-
Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L. J. 195 (1978); Developments in the Law:
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HA v. L. REv. 1190 (1974)[hereinafter
Developments in the Law].
3. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1978)(holding that parens patriae
power gives the state an interest "in providing care to its citizens who are unable
because of emotional disorders to care for themselves"); Jarvis v. Levine 418
N.W.2d 139, 145 (Minn. 1988)(holding that "intrusive" treatment may not be
forced on unconsenting, competent mental patients).
4. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987); Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 426 (1978); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24 (1905); Develop-
ments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1233-34.
5. The boundaries of police power commitments only rarely have been the subject of
careful study. Notable exceptions include ALLEN E. BucmsAN & DAN W. BROCK,
DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETmcs OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 329, 332
(1989); Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1233-34; John Q. La Fond, An
Examination of the Purposes of Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30 BUFF. L. REV.
499 (1981); Joseph M. Livermore et al., On the Justifications for Civil Commit-
ment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 86 (1968); Robert F. Schopp, Sexual Predators and
the Structure of the Mental Health System: Expanding the Normative Focus of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 161, 181 (1995); Note,
Standards of Mental Illness in the Insanity Defense and Police Power Commit-
ments: A Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 60 MINN. L. REv. 1289, 1298
(1976)(arguing that police power commitments are justified by inability to control
behavior). I have also addressed the issue in Eric S. Janus, Preventing Sexual
Violence: Setting Principled Constitutional Boundaries on Sex Offender Commit-
ments, 72 IND. L. J. 157, 208-12 (1996)[hereinafter Janus, Preventing].
6. Schopp, supra note 5.
1997]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ness," to mental disorders that are amenable to involuntary
treatment.7
Litigation testing the constitutionality of sex offender commitment
statutes has prompted the debate concerning the scope of police power
commitments.8 As this article goes to press, the United States
Supreme Court has issued its decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, uphold-
ing the constitutionality of Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act.
The precedential implications of the Court's decision will depend on
careful analysis of the conceptual framework applied. Schopp's and
Winick's articles are among the most comprehensive recent efforts to
attempt to establish such frameworks. Schopp and Winick derive re-
sults similar to other's proposals. Roughly speaking, they propose
that civil commitment is appropriate only when an individual's
mental impairments render the person incompetent or unable to con-
trol his behavior.9 I undertake a critique of Winick's and Schopp's ar-
ticles because I believe that their results are substantially correct but
are more sturdily supported through conceptual frameworks that dif-
fer in small but important ways.
II. CHOOSING A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A conceptual framework sets forth the "givens" from which an
analysis proceeds and often determines the results of the analysis and
the generalizability of those results. In the present project, three
"moves" establish the framework's essential structure. The first es-
tablishes the "explicandum," the concept that is to be explicated. This
choice determines whether we will look for limits on police power com-
mitments from within the civil commitment system itself or from a
broader context, such as the criminal justice system. The second ele-
ment resolves whether the framework will pursue an interest-based or
a rights-based analysis. This determines whether the limits will arise
from the variations in the rights of the individual or in the interests of
the state. The third choice determines the role for medical or behav-
ioral science in setting limits on civil commitment.
7. Bruce J. Winick, Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Significance of Mental
Illness, 1 PSYCHOL. PuB. PoL'y & L. 534 (1995).
8. See Garcetti v. Rasmussen, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), superseded
by 931 P.2d 262 (Cal. 1997); In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996), rev'd, 117
S. Ct. 2072 (1997); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 849 (1994); In re Linehan (II), 544 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), affd,
557 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1996); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993), habeas
corpus granted, Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995); State v.
Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 122 (Wis. 1995).
9. For other similar proposals, see generally BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 5, at
327-28; Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1215; Janus, Preventing, supra
note 5, at 208-12; Livermore et al., supra note 5, at 81, 86.
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In the following sections, I introduce each of these variables and
then propose a set of benchmarks or criteria for evaluating the explan-
atory power of the choices at each juncture.
A. Broad vs. Narrow Explicandum
The problem posed here can be seen as a problem of "explication,"
that is, taking an old concept, one whose "everyday" use has become
inexact, and making it more exact.3o The old concept, "civil commit-
ment," has become inexact because social forces"l demand the use of
civil commitment in circumstances that teeter at or near traditional
boundaries: states want to use civil commitment to continue confine-
ment of sex offenders who previously have been criminally sentenced
and have served their time. This trend requires states to stretch old
ideas of what is required for civil commitment12 and demands that the
old concept be explicated or replaced by a new concept (perhaps re-
taining the same term as the old concept), and thereby clarifies the
boundary conditions for the new concept.13
One common problem in debates about explication is that disagree-
ments that appear to be about the explicatum (the new, more precisely
defined concept) are really about the explicandum (the old concept to
be explicated). That is, the discrepancy is traceable to different start-
ing points-the disagreement arises because different concepts are be-
ing explicated.14 Thus, a first step in the process of explication is to be
as clear as possible about what "old" concept is the explicandum and to
use that clarity to choose an explicandum that will yield the most use-
ful explication.
Consider these three candidates for explicandum. The first and
narrowest explicandum defines the limits of involuntary "psychiatric
hospitalization." The second, slightly broader explicandum defines
the limits of the state's "mental health" power. The third and
broadest explicandum seeks the boundaries of the state's power to use
a civil proceeding to indefinitely deprive an individual of liberty for
purposes of social control. The first two candidates correspond
10. The old concept is called the "explicandum." Explication seeks to replace the ex-
plicandum with a new, more carefuly defined concept, the "explicatum." See Ru-
dolf Carnap, The Two Concepts of Probability, 5 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES.
513, 513 (1945).
11. See Eric S. Janus, The Practice of Sex Offender Commitments: Debunking the
Official Narrative and Revealing Rules in Use, 8 STAN. L. & Poi'Y REv. (forthcom-
ing 1997)(manuscript at 2-3, on file with the Nebraska Law Review)[hereinafter
Janus, The Practice of Sex Offender Commitments]; John Q. La Fond, Washing-
ton's Sexually Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate Misuse of the Therapeutic State
for Social Control, 15 U. PuGET SouND L. REv. 655, 661 (1992).
12. Janus, The Practice of Sex Offender Commitments, supra note 11, at 2-3.
13. Carnap, supra note 10, at 520.
14. Id.
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roughly to the frameworks chosen by Winick and Schopp. Elsewhere,
I have suggested an analysis using the third.15
Their choices of explicandum lead Schopp and Winick to seek the
boundaries of civil commitment through a method that is, at least in
part, endogenous; that is, they seek to derive the limits from the es-
sential nature of civil commitment itself. The third candidate for ex-
plicandum suggests a method that is exogenous. This method seeks to
define civil commitment from without by understanding where civil
commitment fits in the broader scheme of social control and police
power.16 Note that the third candidate does not appear to assume
that mental disorder will play a limiting role. In contrast, the first
two candidates logically and historically entail a role for mental disor-
der. Thus, only the third candidate allows exploration of the possibil-
ity of some forms of "civil commitment" without the presence of a
"mental disorder."
B. Individual Rights/Status vs. State Interest Analysis
Any explication of the boundaries of civil commitment must offer a
theory explaining why certain individuals with certain conditions are
subject to civil commitment, while others are not.17 Two theories are
available. One focuses on the individual who is subject to commitment
and asks whether the individual has the right or the "status" to avoid
civil commitment. The presence or absence of "mental disorder" af-
fects the individual's legal status and commitment rights. Under this
"rights/status" theory, the presence of a mental disorder denotes a dif-
ferent status, and ultimately, diminished rights. For example, an in-
dividual's inability to act autonomously curtails her right to make
medical care decisions.1 S
In the second theory, the interest-based theory, the variable is the
state's interests, not an individual's rights. The individual's right to
make his own decisions remains constant, but in certain circum-
stances, the state's interest reaches a level that justifies overriding the
individual's rights. In the interest-based theory, in contrast to the
15. Janus, Preventing, supra note 5, at 208-12.
16. Schopp's analysis is a mixture of both methods, but, in the end, he appears to
settle on an analysis in which the limits of civil commitment are derived from the
ways in which civil commitment treats the individual, rather than from the
proper role civil (as opposed to criminal) confinement plays in the vindication of
the state's police power. See Schopp, supra note 5, at 167-68.
17. In Schopp and Sturgis' terminology, the boundary must not only discriminate
among individuals, but also must provide a justification for the discrimination.
See Robert F. Schopp & Barbara J. Sturgis, Sexual Predators and Legal Mental
Illness for Civil Commitment, 13 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 437, 447, 450 (1995).
18. In Schopp's terminology, the impairment of an individual's "autonomous capaci-
ties" curtails his or her "sovereignty," or right to self-determination. Schopp,
supra note 5, at 173.
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rights/status theory, mental disorder does not create a classification of
individuals with curtailed civil rights or a diminished civic
personality.19
I suggest in this Article that both Winick and Schopp appear to
rely on a rights/status approach, though they embrace such an ap-
proach ambiguously. The approach appears to be a product of their
endogenous analysis, which seeks the boundaries of police power com-
mitment by looking within its essential nature. The exogenous ap-
proach, on the other hand, factors in the analysis the state's interest
in using the civil commitment system, rather than the criminal justice
system, as a social control tool in particular circumstances.
C. The Role of Medical and Social Scientific Discourse
A third feature of the conceptual framework concerns the manner
in which concepts, classifications, medical knowledge, and behavioral
science developments enter into the analysis. Both Winick and
Schopp adopt the perspective of therapeutic jurisprudence in their
analyses. A central tenet of this approach is that "empirical informa-
tion from the social sciences can inform legal decision-making and
should indeed be taken into account in legal decision-making."20 The
choice at issue here is not whether, but how that information will
enter into the legal analysis.
For Winick, who chooses psychiatric hospitalization as his expli-
candum, the domain of medicine, medical concepts, and medical ad-
vancements enter into the analysis at an early point and in a
significant, highly normative role.21 Schopp's analysis, in contrast, in-
sists that medicine and the behavioral sciences play a much more de-
scriptive role and enter late in the analytical process. While medical
discourse appears central to Winick's derivation of his high level rules,
behavioral and medical science for Schopp provide the facts that allow
the rules (previously derived) to be applied to individuals.
19. See CLIvE UNSWORTH, THE PoLrIcs OF MIENTAL HEALTH LEGISLATION 36, 41
(1987). Persons with mental disorders are excluded from full participation in the
benefits of a legal personality. "Freedom, responsibility and autonomy" charac-
terize an individual's legal personality. Id.
20. Jeffrey A. Klotz et al., Cognitive Restructuring Through Law: A Therapeutic Ju-
risprudence Approach to Sex Offenders and the Plea Process, 15 U. PUGET SouND
L. REv. 579, 580 (1992).
21. Winick characterizes the role of medicine as less central. I argue below, however,
that medicine plays a central role in setting the constitutional contours of
Winicks explication in a number of ways. See infra notes 25-27 and accompany-
ing text.
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III. EVALUATING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS
The purpose of this Article is to build on the scholarly work of
Schopp and Winick by evaluating the conceptual frameworks they em-
ploy to find the boundaries of civil commitment. In this section I set
forth the criteria I have used to carry out this evaluation.
A. How Well Does the Framework Focus on Police
Power Commitments Rather Than Parens
PatHiae Commitments?
This Article seeks a conceptual framework that will help define the
boundaries of police power commitments. This is a harder task than
finding the boundaries for parens patriae commitments. Police power
and parens patriae considerations are often intertwined in discussions
of civil commitment. A conceptual framework must sort out the role
for each.
It is possible that the parens patriae and police powers of the state
are jointly necessary for the constitutional application of civil commit-
ment.22 If this is true, "pure" police power commitment is nonexis-
tant. All commitments are mixed. The mental disorder limits of
"police power" commitments would be exactly the same as those for
"parens patriae" commitments. The problem of finding the mental dis-
order boundaries for police power commitments would translate into
the much easier problem of finding boundaries for parens patriae
commitments.
On the other hand, it is possible that "pure" police power commit-
ments are permissible. These are commitments for which the state's
parens patriae power, standing alone, provides insufficient support.
In these cases, the state's parens patriae power either is not triggered
at all (perhaps because the individual remains competent to choose
her own health care) or the state's public protection interests require
confinement that extends beyond the confinement required by the
parens patriae interests. 23 In this Article, I will use the term "police
22. This was the position advocated by the American Psychiatric Association in its
Amicus Brief in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992). Identifying the parens
patriae power as a "special power applicable to the mentally ill," the Association
argued that "when dealing with the mentally ill the state may also rely on its
parens patriae power, growing out of its historical role as 'guardian of all infants,
idiots and lunatics.'" Amicus Brief for American Psychiatric Association at 8, 11,
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992)(No. 90-5844).
23. See BucsmAN & BnocK, supra note 5, at 315. "Pure" police power commitments
are permissible where, for example, treatment could be appropriately provided in
a low-security or outpatient setting, but the risk posed by the patient is said to
warrant a secure setting. Other examples might include a patient whose condi-
tion proves resistant to treatment, see Winick, supra note 7, at 574, or a patient
for whom the risks (side effects) of treatment outweigh its benefits, or a patient
who has an advanced health care directive that withholds consent for treatment.
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power commitments" to refer to commitments inadequately supported
by the parens patriae power standing alone.
A conceptual framework with strong explanatory power will ac-
complish one of two things: either it will help derive the boundaries
for police power commitments, or it will help establish that "police
power commitment" is an empty concept, i.e., that all commitments
are parens patriae commitments.
B. Explaining Gaps and Overlaps
A second criterion for judging a conceptual framework is how well
it answers questions about the relationship between civil commitment
and the criminal justice system. There are two aspects to this impor-
tant question. The "overlap" issue-can the same individual, or same
set of circumstances, be addressed by both the criminal justice and
civil commitment systems?-is central to the current litigation about
sex offender commitments. 24 The "gap" issue-is there some danger-
ous behavior that cannot be addressed by either system?-is equally
important in public policy debates about the insanity defense.25
Note that I will use the term "civil commitment" to mean all liberty
deprivation that is "civil," and not "criminal." I do not intend to dis-
cuss at length the factors that constitute a criminal proceeding;2 6 by
"civil" I mean proceedings in which a state claims to be exempt from
restrictions imposed on "criminal" proceedings.27 Thus, in rough
terms, I intend "civil commitment" to mean noncriminal deprivation of
See MINN. STAT. § 253B.03, subd. 6c (1996)(setting forth procedures for an ad-
vanced declaration regarding mental health care).
24. See, e.g., In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2522 (1997);
In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 849 (1994); In
re Linehan (II), 544 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), affd, 557 N.W.2d 171
(Minn. 1996); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993), habeas corpus granted,
Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995); State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d
115, 122 (Wis. 1995).
25. See generally HENRY J. STEADiN ET AL., BEFORE AND AF=ER HINcKE : EvALu-
ATING INsANrrY DEFENSE RFoi (1993); Winick, supra note 7, at 551 (discussing
the public policy effects of Foucha and the "therapeutic appropriateness"
principle).
26. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on
the Civil-Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent
Predator Laws, 7 J. CoNTEip. LEGAL IssuEs 69 (1996).
27. Generally, states claim that civil commitment proceedings are exempt from the
following requirements characteristic of the criminal law: prohibitions against
double jeopardy and ex post facto laws; rights to juries as fact finders and to the
highest standard of proof; and prohibitions against criminalizing a status and
basing criminal conviction on predicted, rather than committed, crimes. See Ja-
nus, Preventing, supra note 5, at 188-89.
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liberty by the state.28 In this usage, "psychiatric commitment" and
"mental health commitment" are subsets of civil commitment.
C. Evaluating the Role of Medical and Behavioral Science
The bounds of civil commitment historically have been a site of
contention between medical and "moral" values, and between science
and law.29 A conceptual framework for civil commitment boundaries
must help locate their respective realms. Schopp's and Winick's
frameworks differ sharply on this question. Both Schopp and Winick
emphasize the primacy of legal discourse. Their disagreement is
translated, in large part, into their choices of the proper scale at which
the interface among mental disorder and law and morality is to take
place. Discussions about mental illness or disorder can proceed at a
number of levels: physiological or biological pathology and etiology;
psychological function or dysfunction; and clinical concepts of illness,
disease, or disorder.3O Schopp appears to settle at the intermediate
level (dysfunction) in his linkage with the psychological discourse,
whereas Winick's discussion is split between low level (biological etiol-
ogy) and high level clinical concepts ("illness" and treatment). This
Article offers a comparative evaluation of the two approaches. These
are complex issues. I hope to set forth some basic considerations that
are not intended to be exhaustive.
D. Tracing the Consequences of a Diminished Individual
Rights/Status Approach vs. an Enhanced State
Interests Approach
Historically, civil commitment has been justified on the grounds
that those subjected to it are not whole civic persons because of their
28. I intend for the term "civil commitment" to take up all of the space of the liberty-
deprivation universe that criminal imprisonment does not occupy. It may be that
there are forms of "civil" liberty-deprivation that would be usefully distinguished
from what we think of as civil commitment. For example, imprisonment for civil
contempt might be usefully thought of as a separate category. But, with such
limited exceptions, I intend the term "civil commitment" to include all noncrimi-
nal confinement. Thus, if "preventive detention" is constitutional without a
showing of mental disorder, that sort of confinement would be included. So would
"quarantine," to the extent that this form of public health intervention involves
involuntary, noncriminal confinement. My intent is that the term "civil commit-
ment" should be broad enough to include all forms of confinement that are not
criminal. Thus, if we know the limits of "civil commitment," then we will know
the limits of all confinement that is not criminal.
29. See generally ANDRiw ScuLL, SOcIAL ORDEIRMErmL DISORDER 120-61 (1989)(dis-
cussing shift of responsibility for mentally ill from community to psychiatry).
30. See, e.g., THEODORE MILLON, DISORDERS OF PERSONALrIy DSM-III: Axis II 12-14
(1981)(differentiating among levels of data used by classification systems).
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mental impairments. 31 This approach seems dangerous, especially
when used in the context of the state's police power. For example, in
Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court approved the sterilization of Carrie
Buck; the stated rationale was the state's police power and Buck's
"mental deficiency." Buck can be seen as a case in which the individ-
ual's mental impairment produced a diminished status, which in turn
allowed the state to justify its exercise of police power on the basis of
the medical nature of the sterilization procedure. 3 2
As indicated above, I propose that one understanding of the con-
ceptual frameworks advanced by both Schopp and Winick is that they
rely, implicitly though not explicitly, on a diminished rights/status
justification for police power commitments. Neither writer even re-
motely suggests that mental impairments entail a generalized dimi-
nution in civic personhood. But their frameworks, in conjunction with
the law of unintended consequences, point to an expanded use of ther-
apeutic benefits of medical care to justify social control for mentally
impaired individuals. This approach invites justification based on im-
paired personhood.
IV. WINICE THERAPEUTIC APPROPRIATENESS AND
PARENS PATRIAE
A. Introduction
Professor Winick frames his inquiry as a search for the bounds of
involuntary psychiatric hospitalization.33 His analysis contains three
critical steps. First, civil commitment is an "essentially medical" in-
tervention. Second, a necessary (but insufficient) justification for civil
commitment is that the intervention must be therapeutically appro-
priate. Third, civil commitment is limited to individuals with certain
severe functional impairments of their mental functioning.
Applying these three principles to his impressive command of the
psychiatric and behavioral science literature, Winick shows that only
the "major mental illnesses"-schizophrenia and bipolar affective dis-
order-are appropriate predicates for civil commitment. In contrast,
personality disorders and sexual paraphilias, the disorders commonly
31. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (holding that the subject, by rea-
son of mental impairment, was not wholly free); UNSWORTH, supra note 19, at 36-
42 (mental disorder produced a "subordinate legal status," not "fully human");
Jeffrey G. Murphy, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy, in ETmcs
AN PERsONALITY 217 (John Deigh ed., 1983)(arguing psychopaths are "morally
dead" and hence not entitled "that special kind of respect" reserved for persons).
32. The connection between police power commitments and Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S.
200 (1927), was noted in the Brief for the State of Minnesota in Minnesota ex rel.
Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
33. Winick, supra note 7, at 538.
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underlying sex offender commitments, fall outside of the bounds for
civil commitment.
Despite its weight, Winick's framework displays ambivalence that
impairs its utility, especially in the context of police power commit-
ments. In this Part, I trace these fuzzy spots in Winick's framework
and their consequences.
Winick is ambivalent about two key aspects of his framework.
First, it is unclear whether the "essentially medical" character of civil
commitment is part of the explicandum (a given in the argument) or
whether it is derived from other foundation principles. This ambiva-
lence renders the principle of therapeutic appropriateness indetermi-
nate. I will show that the principle has both a strong and a weak form
and will then trace the consequences of each.
Winick is also ambivalent about the role the parens patriae power
plays in his explication. It is unclear whether Winick assumes a cen-
tral role for the parens patriae interest or derives some role for the
interest, central or otherwise. This ambivalence in turn renders un-
clear Winick's functional impairment framework.
Because of these ambiguities, it is not at all apparent that Winick
has undertaken the broader task of locating the limits of all mental
health intervention. Thus, evaluation of his conceptual framework as
a candidate for pinpointing the limits of police power commitments
may unfairly broaden the intended context. That said, such an evalu-
ation is worthwhile. Winick skillfully articulates a particular ap-
proach to the boundary-setting problem; critiquing his approach can
only help achieve even greater clarity and explanatory power in a con-
ceptual framework.
B. The Strong and Weak Versions of Winick's Therapeutic
Appropriateness Principle
Winick's central argument proceeds in five steps. First, Winick
identifies civil commitment with involuntary psychiatric hospitaliza-
tion.34 Second, he proposes that psychiatric hospitalization is an in-
tervention that is "essentially medical."35 Third, he suggests medical
interventions are improper unless they are capable of rendering a
therapeutic benefit.3 6 Thus, the principle of therapeutic appropriate-
34. Id. Winick poses the issue as follows: what qualifies "as a mental illness for the
purpose of commitment to a psychiatric hospital[?]" Id.
35. Winick characterizes contemporary psychiatric hospitals as offering essentially
short-term medical intervention for acute, organically-based illnesses. The mod-
em psychiatric hospital is a "short-term medical intervention facility that pro-
vides drug treatment and supportive therapy for patients' functional restoration."
Id. at 539.
36. Id. "If the condition is not subject to hospital treatment that can produce benefi-
cial clinical effects," then hospitalization should not be permitted. Id.
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ness limits civil commitments. Fourth, Winick turns to the scientific
literature to show that psychiatric hospitalization yields therapeutic
benefits with respect to some, but not all, mental disorders.37 Finally,
he concludes that the "major mental illnesses," but not antisocial per-
sonality disorder or sexual paraphilias, are proper predicates for civil
commitments. 38
Let us examine parts of the argument more carefully. Winickes
first step introduces important ambivalence into the argument. He is
unclear about whether the identification of civil commitment and psy-
chiatric hospitalization is a given, or rather a part of what he claims to
have demonstrated. If it is part of the explicandum, then he is merely
describing the bounds inherent in current psychiatric practice, leaving
open the possibility that there are permissible forms for civil commit-
ment outside of "psychiatric hospitalization."3 9 This has little explan-
atory power for finding the bounds of police power commitments. In
fact, one can precisely characterize the central question presented in
the sex offender commitment cases as whether the state may act
outside the bounds of traditional psychiatric hospitalization when de-
signing civil commitment schemes and institutions.40
With this in mind, observe that Winick's argument, and the princi-
ple of therapeutic appropriateness he derives, can be understood in
strong and weak forms. In the weak form, the identification of civil
commitment with psychiatric hospitalization is assumed to be part of
the explicandum, the "given" in the argument. The weak version de-
fines where, but not whether, an individual may be committed. It sim-
ply stands for the proposition that a person who is committed must be
placed in an appropriate institutional setting and afforded any avail-
able therapies that are at least capable of providing some beneficial
effect for the individual. Winicles conclusion holds for psychiatric hos-
pitalization, but his argument as a whole is silent about the constitu-
tionality of forms of intervention outside of the traditional psychiatric
37. Id. According to Winick, psychiatric hospitals are inappropriate settings for
those conditions that are not "amenable to organic treatment approaches." Id.
38. Id. at 539-40. Only the major mental illnesses are amenable to the organic treat-
ment approaches used in modem psychiatric hospitals.
39. Winickls extensive focus on "psychiatric hospitalization" suggests that his inquiry
is limited. On the other hand, he argues that the therapeutic appropriateness
principle in Foucha applies "[wihenever the state seeks to invoke its mental
health power to invade significant constitutionally protected liberty interests."
Id. at 551 (emphasis added).
40. "It does not appear that the three categories mentioned in Foucha were meant to
be exclusive. Minnesota, for example, provides for civil commitment without a
finding of mental illness in three other situations." In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d
910, 914 n.6 (Minn. 1994). These situations are governed by Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.02, subd. 14 (1992)(mentally retarded); Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 2
(1992Xchemically dependent); and Minn. Stat. § 144.4172, subd. 8 (1992)(a
health threat to others). Id.
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intervention. In the strong form, Winick's argument asserts that psy-
chiatric hospitalization is the only permissible form of civil commit-
ment. The strong form of the principle allows only one form of civil
commitment-psychiatric hospitalization-and consequently limits
commitment to mental disorders appropriately treated with the "es-
sentially medical" intervention of psychiatry.41
Applying the strong and weak forms to circumstances common in
sex offender commitment cases demonstrates differences in the two
forms. These cases most often involve the question of whether antiso-
cial personality disorder and sexual paraphilias can be appropriately
counted as mental disorder predicates for civil commitments. 42
Winick shows these forms of mental disorders are inappropriately
treated using organic therapies of the modern psychiatric hospital.43
Using the principle of therapeutic appropriateness (whether in its
weak or strong form), persons with such disorders would be inappro-
priately committed to psychiatric hospitals.
But this analysis invites an immediate retort: Could the state
build a different sort of institution and then commit individuals with
the appropriate mental disorders to the new institutions? For exam-
ple, Minnesota has spent millions of dollars to construct facilities and
41. The American Psychiatric Association's Model State Law on Civil Commitment
adopts the stronger version of the principle. See MODEL STATE LAW ON CrVIL
Corvr mNT OF THE MENTALY ILL (American Psychiatric Ass'n 1982), reprinted
in Clifford D. Stromberg & Alan A. Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commit-
ment of the Mentally Ill, 20 HARv. J. LEGIs. 275 (1983). The article notes that the
statute requires that "effective treatment will be provided. Many dangerous peo-
ple cannot be treated effectively, so that present statutes confining them to
mental hospitals merely achieve preventive detention under a therapeutic guise.
This is both bad law and bad medicine." Id. at 281. See generally Mary L. Dur-
ham & John Q. La Fond, "Thank you Dr. Stone"." A Response to Dr. Alan Stone
and Some Further Thoughts on the Wisdom of Broadening the Criteria for Invol-
untary Therapeutic Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 40 RUTGERs L. REv. 865
(1988)(criticizing that aspect of the Model Law); Alan A. Stone, Broadening the
Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitment: A Reply to Durham and La Fond, 5
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 412 (1987)(defending the therapeutic orientation of the
Model Law).
42. See, e.g., In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2522 (1997);
In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 146 (1994);
In re Linehan (II), 544 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), affld, 557 N.W.2d 171
(Minn. 1996); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993), habeas corpus granted,
Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995); State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d
115, 122 (Wis. 1995); Schopp, supra note 5, at 171; Winick, supra note 7, at 554-
55.
43. Winick shows that the "major mental illnesses"-schizophrenia and bipolar affec-
tive disorder, but not antisocial personality disorder-are appropriately treated
using the organic therapies of the contemporary psychiatric hospital. Winick,
supra note 7, at 572-75.
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programs aimed at sex offenders.44 Minnesota's sex offender commit-
ment scheme centers around a newly built, special purpose facility
with a "treatment program" designed specifically for sex offenders.45
Such treatment programs are not always successful, but evidence
demonstrates they are capable of providing some therapeutic benefit
to at least some individuals.46 Winick sets the potential-benefits bar
quite low for his therapeutic appropriateness test,4 7 so it is at least
arguable that these newly established programs would be deemed
therapeutically appropriate for sex offenders. Thus, the weak form of
the therapeutic appropriateness principle would accommodate sex of-
fender commitments, while the strong form would exclude them be-
cause they fall outside of the scope of traditional psychiatric
intervention.
As noted, Winick seems ambivalent about whether he is advocat-
ing the strong or the weak version. His extensive focus on "psychiatric
hospitalization" suggests that his inquiry is limited. Winick recog-
nizes that the strong form of the principle would prohibit states from
hospitalizing mentally ill individuals whose illnesses have proven to
be "refractive to drug treatment" and who may be assaultive or other-
44. PROGRAM EVALUATION DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDrrOR (MINNE-
SOTA), PSYCHOPATIC PERSONALrY Col isrNT LAw 1 (Feb. 1994)(noting $28.55
million was appropriated for construction and improvement of facilities desig-
nated for psychopathic personality commitments); Conrad deFiebre, Psycho-
pathic Sex Offenders Get New Home, STAR Tam. (Minneapolis), Nov. 5, 1995, at
lB.
45. Id. See MN-NESOTA PSYCHOPATmC TREATMENT CTR., MUESOTA SECURITY Hosp.,
SEX OFFENDER PRoG.Ass (rev. ed. 1993).
46. Gordon C. Nagayama Hall, Sexual Offender Recidivism Revisited. A Meta-Analy-
sis of Recent Treatment Studies, 63 J. CONsuLrING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 802
(1995).
Winick suggests organic therapy is the only form of therapy that can be thera-
peutic if it is coerced. Other forms of therapy, particularly the type used for sex
offenders, depend on the individual's voluntary participation for therapeutic ben-
efit. From this, Winick concludes only organic therapy can be therapeutic in the
coerced setting of civil commitment. But Winick's argument appears to ignore
that individuals may experience civil commitment at various places along the
coerced-voluntary continuum. Sex offender treatment cannot be profitably
"forced" on an unwilling individual in the same way as medical injections. None-
theless, the prospect of facing a lengthy civil commitment may convince some
individuals that cooperation with treatment may expedite their release. While
such cooperation is not fully free, neither is it fully coerced. Winick recognizes
the possibilty of this dynamic. See Winick, supra note 7, at 600 (possibility of
release is incentive for treatment success). Some courts likewise recognize this
possibility. See Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1995).
47. Winickls article appears to set several standards for the therapeutic appropriate-
ness principle. In places, he seems to set the bar quite low: "Unless a condition is
at least potentially amenable to hospital treatment, it should not serve as a predi-
cate for involuntary commitment." Winick, supra note 7, at 563 (emphasis
added).
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wise dangerous. 48 He reluctantly seems to acknowledge that states
might be able to use "preventive detention" as a supplement to the
"criminal sanction."49 Preventive detention, he says, should not be in
a psychiatric hospital, but rather in a "detention center."50
The strong version of the therapeutic appropriateness principle
would not permit preventive detention. Under the strong version,
civil commitment (understood in the broad sense as discussed above)51
is essentially limited to medical intervention. Commitment to a "de-
tention center" would be prohibited. The weak version determines
where, but not whether, a dangerous person could be preventively de-
tained. Thus, if Winick envisions the existence of such detention cen-
ters, he must embrace the weak version of the principle of therapeutic
appropriateness.
There is additional reason to conclude Winick supports the weak
version. For almost as long as madhouses have existed, reformers
have feared they would be used inappropriately to confine those who
are not truly mentally ill.52 However, this concern was not a genera-
lized concern about wrongful confinement, but rather a particular con-
cern arising out of the particularly horrific nature of madhouses and
insanity. This concern is reflected in the Supreme Court decision in
Addington v. Texas,53 in which the Court worries about the stigma
that could attach to committed persons who are not "truly" mentally
ill.94 In Foucha v. Louisiana,55 Justice Thomas seemed to recoil at the
48. Id. at 582.
49. Id. at 583.
50. Id. It is unclear how seriously Winick advocates this proposition. The preventive
detention, he argues, must be of the "narrowly focused" sort referred to by the
Foucha Court. This style of preventive detention was applied in United States v.
Salerno, where detention was limited to a brief and definite period prior to the
criminal trial. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987). This form
of preventive detention would not support police power commitments of untreat-
able though dangerous individuals.
51. See supra section IV.B and accompanying notes.
52. See SCULL, supra note 29, at 74.
53. 441 U.S. 418 (1978).
54. See id. at 427-28. The Addington Court, in the process of highlighting why the
Constitution protects its citizens from unfettered government intrusion, made
these observations:
[A]t one time or another every person exhibits some abnormal behavior
which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or emo-
tional disorder, but which is in fact within a range of conduct that is
generally acceptable. Obviously, such behavior is no basis for compelled
treatment and surely none for confinement. However, there is the possi-
ble risk that a factflnder might decide to commit an individual based
solely on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct. Loss of liberty
calls for a showing that the individual suffers from something more seri-
ous than is demonstrated by idiosyncratic behavior.
Id. at 426-27. See generally ScuLL, supra note 29, at 57 (describing in vivid detail
nineteenth century society's view that mental illness is "a condition that re-
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idea of a "sane" person "forced to share a cell" with a truly insane per-
son, though he saw no problem with keeping the noninsane Foucha
confined until he could prove that he was no longer dangerous.56 Jus-
tice Thomas' concern at most focused on where, not whether, Foucha
was confined. Winick seems to reflect this historical concern about
"psychiatric" hospitalization. He refers to the "massive deprivations
and lasting stigmatization" as a particularly distinguishing feature of
"mental hospitalization" that apparently is absent from "preventive
detention."57
The weak version of the principle also seems consistent with as-
pects of the history of civil commitment, which reveals an evolving
differentiation among confinees that expanded as the notions of treat-
ment grew more sophisticated. Thus, the idea that there would be
different sorts of institutions, or parts of institutions, for people with
different forms of mental disorder and hence different treatment
needs, is well established.58 Nothing in the essential nature of mental
institutions dictates that they retain a particular form. Civil commit-
ment commonly is used for mental retardation, chemical depen-
dency,59 and mental illness. Following this line of thinking, it is
quirets] taming, as one might domesticate and thus render predictable the behav-
ior of a wild beast ....
55. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
56. In his dissent in Foucha, Justice Thomas observed:
In particular circumstances, of course, it may be unconstitutional for a
State to confine in a mental institution a person who is no longer insane.
This would be a different case had Foucha challenged specific conditions
of confinement-for instance, being forced to share a cell with an insane
person, or being involuntarily treated after recovering his sanity.
Id. at 125 n.18 (emphasis in original). But one of the main themes of his dissent
was to attack the majority's apparent focus on the "psychiatric" nature of the
institution to which Foucha was confined:
Finally, I see no basis for holding that the Due Process Clause per se
prohibits a State from continuing to confine in a "mental institution"-
the federal constitutional definition of which remains unclear-an in-
sanity acquittee who has recovered his sanity....
... I have no idea what facilities the Court or Justice O'Connor be-
lieve the Due Process Clause mandates for the confinement of sane-but-
dangerous insanity acquittees. Presumably prisons will not do, since im-
prisonment is generally regarded as "punishment." May a State desig-
nate a wing of a mental institution or prison for sane insanity
acquittees? May a State mix them with other detainees? Neither the
Constitution nor our society's traditions provide any answer to these
questions.
Id. at 124-25.
57. Winick, supra note 7, at 583. "[Tjhe massive deprivations and lasting stigmatiza-
tion of mental hospitalization may make a humane form of preventative deten-
tion less restrictive than hospital confinement." Id.
58. ScuLL, supra note 29, at 220 (discussing the pressures to differentiate among the
institutionalized "mad").
59. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)(acknowledging the possibil-
ity of civil commitment for persons who are addicted).
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acceptable that additional forms of intervention ought to develop over
time.
On the other hand, there is good evidence that Winick embraces
the strong version of the principle of therapeutic appropriateness. He
invokes a strong version when he argues that the therapeutic appro-
priateness principle applies "[wihenever the state seeks to invoke its
mental health power to invade significant constitutionally protected
liberty interests .... "-60 Although he mentions the idea of nonmedical
"detention centers," he is reluctant about the idea and does not advo-
cate it.61 More importantly, he apparently has in mind the highly con-
strained form of preventive detention approved by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Salerno.62 Salerno involved pretrial confinement
designed to prevent harm by a criminal defendant who was awaiting
trial. In Foucha, the Court declined an invitation to extend Salerno to
allow indefinite, dangerousness-based confinement.63 Further,
Winick is quite clear that disorders such as antisocial personality dis-
order and sexual paraphilias cannot support civil commitment.64 As I
have shown previously, Winick's framework for analysis seems to ex-
clude these disorders only if the. strong version of his theory is
adopted.
Winick's derivation of the therapeutic appropriateness principle
from Foucha sheds no additional light on this ambivalence. Winick
frames the derivation as if he understands the principle to be of the
strong variety, applicable not simply to "psychiatric hospitalization,"
but to all exercises of the state's mental health power.65 But his deri-
vation assumes, rather than demonstrates, that the civil commitment
involved was essentially medical, a characterization consistent with
the weak version of the principle.
In Foucha, the Court resolved the issue of whether Louisiana could
continue to hold Foucha under civil commitment. Foucha was still
"dangerous" and diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder, but
he was no longer diagnosed with the "mental illness" that led to his
initial commitment. The Court's decision, ordering Foucha's release,
can be read in at least three ways. First, it can be read as rejecting
60. See Winick, supra note 7, at 551 (emphasis added).
61. See id. at 583.
62. See id. (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987)).
63. I develop this theme at length in Janus, Preventing, supra note 5, at 162-77.
64. See Winick, supra note 7, at 572-74. According to Winick, "many of the 'person-
ality disorders' do not seem to be 'lnesses' in an organic sense (although they do
reflect maladaptive behavior patterns)." Id. at 572-73. Winick consequently con-
cludes that "[u]nless the individual has a multiple diagnosis, these problems are
not thought to be organic in nature and do not respond to organic treatment
methods of the kind for which hospitalization is medically justified." Id. at 574
(citations omitted).
65. See id. at 554.
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Louisiana's argument that commitments may be supported on the ba-
sis of dangerousness alone.6 6 Second, the decision might have been
based on the absence of a compelling interest, including Foucha's anti-
social personality disorder, that could not be vindicated in the crimi-
nal justice system.6 7 Third, the court might have rejected antisocial
personality disorder as a predicate for commitment because, as Jus-
tice White observed, treatment for the condition is nonexistant. 68
Clearly, only the third reading supports the therapeutic appropri-
ateness principle. Winick chooses the third alalysis because he reads
Foucha as the third case in a series, preceded by Washington v.
Harper6 9 and Riggins v. Nevada.7 0 Harper and Riggins are cases
dealing with the involuntary administration of psychotropic medica-
tions. Foucha is a case in the same series only if it also involves inter-
vention that is "essentially medical." But others might read Foucha
just as cogently in ways, represented by the first and second readings,
that do not entail the notion that all civil commitment is essentially
medical.
In sum, the strong version of the therapeutic appropriateness prin-
ciple holds only if all civil commitment must be to a psychiatric hospi-
tal. Winick has not shown this to be the case. He is left with the weak
version, a principle that offers little guidance in setting the bounda-
ries of police power commitment.
66. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77 (1992).
67. Id. at 82. Justice White, writing for the majority, expressed the following.
[Tihe State does not explain why its interest would not be vindicated by
the ordinary criminal processes involving charge and conviction, the use
of enhanced sentences for recidivists, and other permissible ways of deal-
ing with patterns of criminal conduct. These are the normal means of
dealing with persistent criminal conduct. Had they been employed
against Foucha when he assaulted other inmates, there is little doubt
that if then sane he could have been convicted and incarcerated in the
usual way.
Id.
68. Id. at 82-83. Winicks position is as follows:
Arguably, Foucha should be read to apply a newly crystallized due pro-
cess principle: Whenever the state seeks to invoke its mental health
power to invade significant constitutionally protected liberty interests,
its proposed intervention must be therapeutically justified. Foucha dem-
onstrates that this condition will not be satisfied unless the individual in
question is mentally ill. Although Foucha's continued hospitalization
would have accomplished the state's compelling police power interest in
protecting community safety, it would not have been therapeutically ap-
propriate to confine an individual in a psychiatric hospital who no longer
suffered from a treatable mental illness.
Winick, supra note 7, at 551.
69. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
70. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
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C. Functional Impairment Criteria and Parens
Patriae Commitments
In addition to the principle of therapeutic appropriateness, Winick
posits that commitments are limited to mental disorders that impair
the individual's mental functioning in particular and severe ways.71
In this section I suggest that Winick's discussion of these functional
impairment criteria reflects an important ambivalence about whether
the state's parens patriae power is a necessary condition for civil com-
mitments. I alluded to this issue at the beginning of this paper, fram-
ing the question in terms of whether "pure" police power commitments
(those that extend beyond the state's parens patriae power) are possi-
ble. Winick's explication fails to provide a clear answer in part be-
cause he appears to assume as a given (but only in an ambivalent
way) that all commitments must reflect the parens patriae power.
For Winick, as for many others, mental disorders are adequate
predicates for civil commitment only if the disorders entail severe im-
pairments of cognitive and/or volitional functioning.72 Further, like
others, Winick asserts that the nature of the required impairments is
related to "justifications for involuntary hospitalization."73
Winick's statement of the functional impairment criteria strongly
suggests that he views all commitments as parens patriae commit-
ments. At one point he asserts that "[clonditions should not be consid-
ered mental illness sufficient to justify intervention unless they render
individuals incompetent to make rational decisions about hospitaliza-
tion or treatment or unable to control their conduct in ways that may
endanger themselves."74 Later in the article he characterizes the nec-
essary impairment as "significant functional impairment in ways that
prevent the individual from exercising autonomy," which similarly
suggests a relationship to the parens patriae powers of the state.75
Winick is a bit inconsistent, however. In at least one articulation of
the condition, he includes impairments of control that cause harm to
others.76
This discussion of the functional impairment criteria helps us un-
derstand that the state's parens patriae power and the principle of
therapeutic appropriateness are closely related. The strong version of
the therapeutic appropriateness principle makes the most sense if all
71. Winick, supra note 7, at 538. Winick does not specify whether, or under what
circumstances, the functional impairment condition would be sufficient for com-
mitment. He clearly asserts, however, that it is necessary for commitment. Id.
72. See BucHANAN & BROCK, supra note 5, at 319; Developments in the Law, supra
note 2, at 1217; Winick, supra note 7, at 578-79.
73. Winick, supra note 7, at 568.
74. Id. at 539-40.
75. Id. at 567.
76. Id. at 568, 570.
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commitments are parens patriae commitments. Recall that the strong
version of the principle entails the notion that civil commitment is an
"essentially medical" intervention. The imposition of involuntary
health care is justified only if it serves the therapeutic interests of the
individual. The only condition under which medical intervention
could be "therapeutic" for a nonconsenting individual is if the individ-
ual lacks the competency to give consent.77 A competent individual's
nonconsent defines the "benefits" of therapy as outside of his or her
"good."7 8 Both the therapeutic appropriateness principle and the
functional impairment requirement derive centrally from the medical
nature of the intervention. Under this derivation, incompetence is a
necessary condition for therapeutic appropriateness. An involuntary
medical intervention can be therapeutically appropriate only if the
disorder of the individual renders him incompetent.
Reversing the argument, one could also derive the strong version of
the therapeutic appropriateness principle from the premise that all
commitment is parens patriae commitment. Parens patriae commit-
ment is appropriate only when the individual is incompetent and the
intervention is in her therapeutic interests. Only the major mental
illnesses impair functioning in such a manner as to render individuals
incompetent. Only psychiatric hospitalization provides therapeutic
benefit for major mental illnesses. Thus, all (parens patriae) commit-
ment must be "essentially medical."
Note, however, that if the therapeutic appropriateness principle is
understood in its weak form, Winick's derivation of the functional im-
pairment criteria becomes more problematic. If some forms of com-
mitment are not "essentially medical," then the argument for
incompetence as a necessary condition for commitment significantly
weakens. For example, the psycho-social treatment programs ad-
dressed to sex offenders may be effective (and hence therapeutically
appropriate) only when the patient renders some form of consent to
participate. 79 For this sort of commitment, incompetence and lack of
autonomy would probably negate, rather than produce, therapeutic
appropriateness. Further, if we posit a form of civil commitment in
which the main purpose is social control rather than medical care,
then Winick's functional impairment requirement looks quite differ-
ent. Because protecting the public from violence is the purpose of
77. I discuss a variation of this argument below. See infra section V.E and accompa-
nying notes pertaining to "objective" and "subjective" benefit.
78. See Schopp, supra note 5, at 172-73. See generally Bruce J. Winick, On Auton-
omy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VIL. L. REv. 1705, 1711
(1992)(discussing the place of individual autonomy in the legal system).
79. Winick, supra note 7, at 575. Minnesota's sex offender commitment treatment
program identifies the "voluntary" participation of the individual as a measure of
treatment effectiveness. MINNESOTA PSYCHOPATmC TREATMENT CTR., MN ESOTA
SECUR Hosp., SEX OmFNER PROGRAM 1 (rev. ed. 1993).
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these commitments, disorders such as antisocial personality disorder
or paraphilias, which arguably "predispose" the individual to violence,
would be sufficient since they produce "functional impairment in a
way that relates to the justifications for involuntary
hospitalization."80
I do not wish to be misunderstood here. I agree with Winick that
antisocial personality disorders or paraphilias are inadequate predi-
cates for commitment.S1 My point here is simply that the ambivalence
in Winick's framework seems to allow for the opposite conclusion.
D. The Strong Version Entails the High Level Adoption of
Medical Discourse
Historically, physicians (more specifically, psychiatrists) have
fought for dominance in the treatment of the mentally ill.82 Winick's
characterization of the modern psychiatric hospital as "essentially
medical" is a recognition that the medical profession has achieved that
dominance.8 3 His extensive reliance on medical and scientific knowl-
edge invites the question whether Winick has granted medicine and
science a privileged or dominant role in defining the legal boundaries
of civil commitment.
As noted above, science can appear in the explication at an early
stage (providing concepts and values that shape the rules) or at a later
stage (providing the "facts" to which the rules are applied).84 Winick
claims that his use of medicine falls into the latter category. Winick's
"medical model" is coincidental, rather than essential, in the deriva-
tion of the constitutional limits of civil commitment.
[A] medical model of mental illness may... be useful as a rough basis for
thinking about how mental illness should be defined for purposes of involun-
tary hospitalization. This may be so not because the Constitution requires a
medical model, but because other considerations that seem to be constitution-
ally relevant appear to be present for conditions meeting the medical model
but not for conditions that seem to be only psychosocial in nature. 85
80. This is one theory that apparently underlies contemporary sex offender commit-
ment statutes. The Washington sex offender commitment act, and those modeled
after it, define one of the requisite mental conditions, "mental abnormality," as "a
congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity
which predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts .. ."
WAsH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(2) (1992). The Minnesota Court of Appeals pointed
to the "nexus" between a mental disorder and violence as a key factor legitimat-
ing that state's Sexually Violent Persons Act. In re Linehan (II), 544 N.W.2d 308,
317-18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), affd, 557 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1996).
81. See Janus, Preventing, supra note 5, at 194.
82. See ScULL, supra note 29, at 118-23 (examining how "medicine first 'captured'
insanity").
83. See id.
84. See supra section III.C and accompanying notes.
85. Winick, supra note 7, at 563.
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Despite this disclaimer, in some places in his argument Winick ap-
pears to rely on medical discourse to shape, rather than to apply, the
rules. For example, Winick uses the medical concept of illness to
demonstrate that antisocial personality disorder does not meet the
definition of legal mental illness.8 6 He begins this argument by stat-
ing a thoroughly legal definition of "mental illness": "Involuntary con-
finement in a hospital should be possible only when that illness
threatens public health or produces significant functional impairment
in ways that prevent the individual from exercising autonomy."87 Us-
ing behavioral science literature, Winick shows that antisocial person-
ality disorder fails to satisfy the second prong of this rule because it
does not produce autonomy impairment.8 By utilizing science at the
latter stages of analysis, Winick applies the rule to the "facts."
Trouble ensues, however, when science is applied in the first prong of
the rule because it is possible to argue that antisocial personality dis-
order does threaten the public health.89 The conclusion of Winicki's
syllogism-that antisocial personality disorder does not support com-
mitment-can be achieved only if antisocial personality disorder is not
an "illness." But to show this, Winick relies on the medical definition
of illness to deomonstrate that antisocial personality disorder lacks
the features of an "illness in the traditional sense."90 It is not "organic
in nature" and does not respond to organic interventions "that charac-
terize the modern psychiatry hospital."91 Here, the "medical model"
has been used not to apply the rule defining illness, but rather to
shape the rule itself.
The analytical placement of the medical model is a function of
Winick's choice of explicandum. If he starts with the premise that
civil commitment is essentially medical and derives from that premise
his functional impairment criteria, then the medical model enters his
analysis at the very beginning. That which is "essentially medical"
86. In this analysis, antisocial personality disorder is not an illness in large measure
because it is not organic in etiology and does not respond to organic therapy. For
a contrary view arguing that personality disorders and psychotic illnesses ought
to be classified together, see MILoN, supra note 30, at 3 (arguing that
"[plersonality disorders reflect pathogenic processes that are identical to those
seen in classical 'neurotic' and 'psychotic' states"). See generally SCULL, supra
note 29, at 123 ("Psychiatrists' labels stick in a way lay ones don't, not least be-
cause they are backed by the police power of the state. The psychiatrist can
'transform his judgment into social reality.'" (citation omitted)).
87. Winick, supra note 7, at 567.
88. Id. at 570.
89. See Alan Wertheimer, A Philosophical Examination of Coercion for Mental
Health Issues, 11 BEHAv. ScI. & L. 239, 256 (1993). See also Maura Lerner, AMA
Diagnoses a Health Threat to Children: Media Violence, STAR TaRm. (Minneapo-
lis), Sept. 10, 1996, at Al (describing an "epidemic of violence" that "poses a seri-
ous health threat, especially to children").
90. Winick, supra note 7, at 559.
91. Id. at 570.
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becomes the touchstone for defining the scope of commitment. On the
other hand, if he starts with the premise that all commitments are
parens patriae commitments, the role of medicine appears only later
in the analysis when the legal rules are applied.
There is danger in either approach. Science provides an unstable
foundation for defining central legal categories. Winick relies on a
medical definition of "illness" to solidify his argument about antisocial
personality disorder. But there is no stable medical or scientific con-
sensus for the definition of "illness." 92 Winick suggests that both or-
ganic etiology and organic treatment are important factors in the
classification of a condition as an illness. But, consider the following:
There is research tending to show that violence is associated with low
levels of serotonin;93 some physicians use organic therapies to treat
some forms of sexual violence;94 conditions caused by trauma, envi-
ronmental factors, and an individual's own behavior qualify for treat-
ment in medical hospitals; and some forms of antisocial personality
may be hereditary. 95 Further, some scholars claim that at least some
forms of personality disorders are legitimate disorders in some
strongly meaningful ways.96
In short, we may learn more about sexual violence and violence in
general. As we learn more about violence or patterns of violence, it
may become apparent that such behavior may constitute organically
treatable "illnesses." Will, or should, those developments impact the
legal system's treatment of violence? It clearly should be relevant.
But the legal issues are addressed at a different scale of mean-
ing.97 The question should be whether medicine and science inform
our thinking on the moral and political judgments that underlie the
law. To do this, we must first have a firm understanding of the moral
and political structure of those judgments. Thus, it seems the medical
92. See Jerome Wakefield, The Concept of Mental Disorder: On the Boundary Be.
tween Biological Facts and Social Values, 47 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 373 (1992).
93. Robert Wright, The Biology of Violence, NEw YORKER, Mar. 13, 1995, at 68, 74
(emphasizing, however, that the existence and direction of any causal arrow be-
tween violence and serotonin levels is unclear).
94. See generally John McD. Bradford, Treatment of Sexual Offenders, 39 Hosp. &
ComMUNrry PSYCHIATRY 152 (1988)(discussing treatment of sexual offenders with
various chemical agents).
95. See DAvm LYEKEN, THE ANTisOCiAL PERSONALiTIES 108-09 (1995).
96. See, e.g., Grant T. Harris et al., Psychopathy as a Taxon: Evidence that Psycho.
paths Are a Discrete Class, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLUcAL PSYCHOL. 387, 396
(1994); Vernon L. Quinsey, The Prediction and Explanation of Criminal Violence,
18 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 117, 122 (1995)(suggesting that Hare's concept of psy-
chopathy may be a "taxon" or a "categorical variable").
97. Charles Kester, The Language of Law, the Sociology of Science and the Troubles
of Translation: Defining the Proper Role for Scientific Evidence of Causation, 74
NEB. L. REv. 529, 562 (1995)(arguing that "[ilt becomes impossible to tell whether
the same concepts are used by both [scientific and legal] paradigms").
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discourse must enter the analysis after the main legal limitations
have been established.9s
E. Therapeutic Appropriateness, Parens Patriae, and the
Bounds of Police Power Commitments
Recall that the theme of this Article is to develop a conceptual
framework that will allow us to discover the boundaries of police
power commitments. Here, I explore the ways in which Winicks
framework operates in that project. I suggest that the weak version of
the principle of therapeutic appropriateness sets too few boundaries
on police power commitments. The strong version may be too limiting
and introduces the problematic principle that social control may be
justified by way of the "therapeutic interests" of the individual.
I have suggested above that Winick appears to adopt the strong
version of the principle of therapeutic appropriateness in part because
the weak version appears not to limit commitments at all. Indeed, the
only element the weak version controls is where, not whether, an indi-
vidual is civilly committed. This version would insist that police
power commitments provide treatment that is appropriate to the indi-
vidual's condition and that the condition have functional impairments
relating to the state's purpose in the commitment. But, as shown
above, these concerns set few, if any, limits on the state's power.99
The strong version of the principle, on the other hand, either limits
police power commitments very severely or establishes a questionable
linkage between social control and therapeutic interests. Police power
commitments, as I have defined them, are those supported by the
state's interests in public safety, but not by the state's parens patriae
interests. The state's parens patriae interests can fail in two distinct
ways: the individual might be competent to make treatment decisions
or the proposed hospitalization might not be in the individual's thera-
peutic interest.oo In their strong forms, Winick's limiting conditions
for commitment (therapeutic appropriateness plus functional impair-
ments) seem to insure that both conditions for parens patriae commit-
ments will always be met. Thus, it appears that Winick's framework
may allow no room for police power commitments.
As Winick acknowledges, this result produces a gap in the social
control system.101 It is entirely plausible that an individual could be
unreachable by criminal prosecution and also uncommitable under
98. See generally id. ("Ignorance of these difficulties in the translation of scientific
evidence has dramatically increased the risk that scientific evidence will be acci-
dentally misused, or 'mistranslated,' by the fact finder.").
99. See supra section IV.B.
100. Ignore for a moment the question of how unconsented treatment could ever be in
the therapeutic interests of a competent adult.
101. Winick, supra note 7, at 582-83.
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Winick's framework. This is possible because the impairments that
relieve a person of criminal responsibility are not always sufficient to
render a person incompetent to make health care decisions.10 2 Fur-
ther, even if an individual's mental disorder impaired both criminal
responsibility and health-care competence, Winick's therapeutic ap-
propriateness principle might prohibit the commitment. This would
happen if the individual's illness was resistant to the usual treat-
ments or if the individual's therapeutic interests dictated a more open,
community-based treatment setting or shorter institutional stay than
was compatible with the community's safety interests. Such diver-
gence of community interests from individual interests is not a rare
occurrence. Statistics from Minnesota show that "forensic" civil com-
mitments last much longer than nonforensic commitments, suggesting
that public safety considerations often prolong confinement well be-
yond what is necessary for therapeutic benefit.103
Winick's framework can deal with this "gap" in three ways, none of
which is very satisfactory. First, his framework can simply posit some
form of "preventive detention." But this seems dangerous because the
limits for such detention are unclear. Second, his framework could
dilute the meaning of parens patriae. Third, it could argue that the
state's parens patriae interests provide the justification for police
power commitments. I examine the latter two possibilities in this
section.
One way of closing the "gap" is to stretch the meaning of the state's
parens patriae interest to include not only those who cannot make
health care decisions, but also those who are incompetent in the crimi-
nal context. Further, the meaning of "therapeutic benefit" could be
extended to include not only the "subjective" interests of the individ-
ual, but also his or her "objective" interests.
Let us define two senses of the term "therapeutic interests." Objec-
tively, a person's therapeutic interests are measured against an ideal
of proper functioning. Thus, if an individual's cognition is impaired, it
would be in the individual's objective therapeutic interests to restore
her cognition as nearly as possible to its unimpaired or ideal function-
ing. Because the ideal of proper functioning is more or less the same
for all humans, the individual's desires or values do not determine her
objective therapeutic interests. Interests in this sense are often re-
ferred to as a person's "best interests."o 4
102. Schopp develops this point at length. See Schopp, supra note 5, at 179.
103. In Minnesota, "forensic" patients are institutionalized much longer than
nonforensic, though mentally ill, patients. MINNESOTA DEPR=NT OF HUMAN
SERVICES, A SURVEY OF ADULTS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS IN MINNESOTA'S REGIONAL
TREATMENT CENTERS 141 (1991).
104. See David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 WIs. L. REV. 454,
472.
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Contrast a second sense of the term, which I will label the person's
therapeutic interests in the subjective sense. These are the therapeu-
tic goals or effects that the competent person actually chooses for him-
self. Some people might choose abnormal functioning for its own sake;
some might settle for abnormal functioning because the price to be
paid to achieve normal functioning is too high.
In either case, the subjective therapeutic interests of the individual
would not coincide with the objective. Arguably the state's parens pa-
triae obligation is to assist incompetent individuals to attain their sub-
jective therapeutic interests. 0 5 But suppose parens patriae is
redefined so it refers to the objective therapeutic interests of the indi-
vidual.106 Under the redefined terms, it is possible for the state to
recast its own public safety concerns as the "needs" of the individual.
Lengthy confinement is justified on this (newly defined) parens patriae
grounds because the individual "needs" more treatment before he is
ready for release.107 This version of the parens patriae doctrine
should be rejected because it blurs the critical distinction between the
interests of the state and the individual.
The other way to close the gap respects the core meaning of the
parens patriae interest, but argues that this interest provides at least
part of the justification for police power commitments. Theparenspa-
triae power could be used to justify police power commitments in two
ways, both of which yield undesirable results. First, it may be argued
that the therapeutic benefit to the individual justifies, or offsets, the
intrusion on the individual's liberty. In Winick's framework, for ex-
ample, amenability to treatment transforms commitment from an un-
constitutional state intervention into a constitutional state
intervention.308 This formula works well in parens patriae commit-
ments because the intrusion on liberty is calibrated to be proportion-
ate to the benefit derived by the patient. But in police power
commitments, the intrusion is tied to the public's interests, not to the
individual's.
105. See BucHANAN & BocOC, supra note 5, at 317-18.
106. For example, Winick in some places suggests that the measure of therapeutic
appropriateness is whether the individual's "psychiatric condition would benefit"
from treatment. Winick, supra note 7, at 585.
107. Courts often resort to this sort of discourse in commitments that are clearly po-
lice-power based. See, e.g., In re Bieganowski, 520 N.W.2d 525, 531 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994)(reasoning that "[tihe trial court found that the security hospital was
the least restrictive alternative available. Appellant needs long-term treatment
in a group therapy setting. He has not participated in sex offender treatment on
a voluntary basis, and if released would likely fail to participate in treatment.");
In re Stofferahn, No. C5-93-768, 1993 WL 276857, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jul. 27,
1993)(reasoning that "[t]he security hospital did not consider voluntary treat-
ment appropriate, because appellant needs to be in a secure facility").
108. See Winick, supra note 7, at 585 (arguing that a "therapeutic basis for their hos-
pitalization might justify their involuntary commitment).
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The principle inherent in this argument is that "therapeutic" medi-
cal procedures can justify intrusive state ends.109 In Buck v. Bell, the
Supreme Court relied upon this very theory, approving the use of a
medical procedure, sterilization, thereby vindicating a "scientific" the-
ory of individual and public health.11o As Buck illustrates, this theory
allows for limitless intrusion so long as some arguable therapeutic
benefit results.
Second, it might be argued that the individual's incompetence jus-
tifies the public-oriented intrusion. The theory underlying this claim
is that the very fact of having a severe mental disorder diminishes the
individual's interest in, and hence right to, liberty. This, too, is a way
of understanding how the Supreme Court justified imposing an intru-
sive medical procedure on the "feebleminded" Carrie Buck to advance
the public interest.
In no way do I imply that Winick would endorse the reasoning,
results, or anything else about Buck. My only point is that there is
danger in using therapeutic benefit or diminished mental competence
as a justification for intrusive social control measures. As I have indi-
cated above, it may be that Winick does not advocate this sort ofjusti-
fication. Using therapeutic benefit to justify a parens patriae
commitment is not controversial. Winick may intend to limit civil
commitment to those circumstances that trigger the state's parens pa-
triae interest. It is only if the theory extends beyond that benign"'l
form of intervention that the dangers of a Buck-type analysis arise.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that a principle of therapeutic appro-
priateness has a place in a police power commitment framework. It
must function, however, as a limitation on, rather than a partial justi-
fication for, commitment.112 If the principle of therapeutic appropri-
109. Paul A- Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell,
60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 30, 33 (1985).
110. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927); Lombardo, supra note 109, at 33.
111. There is no doubt that the benign intentions ofparens patriae intervention often
result in less than benign consequences. See ScuLL, supra note 29, at 264. But in
Buck, the Supreme Court relied solely upon an analysis that measured the bene-
fit to society:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the
best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon
those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacri-
fices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our
being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if in-
stead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly
unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three
generations of imbeciles are enough.
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927)(citation omitted).
112. In contrast, inparenspatriae commitments, therapeutic benefit is one of the cen-
tral justifications for commitment.
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ateness justifies commitments, police power commitments are
unconstitutional unless therapeutically appropriate treatment is pro-
vided. If no such treatment is available, the commitment is unconsti-
tutional.113 When the principle is used as a limitation, otherwise
constitutional1 14 police power commitments become impermissible if
the state fails to provide available therapeutically appropriate treat-
ment. Use of the principle as a limitation is based on the notion that
state deprivations of liberty must be narrowly tailored or focused. Use
of the principle as a justification is based on the theory that the provi-
sion of treatment to the individual enhances the state's right to in-
trude on the individual's liberty. It is this enhancement theory that
leads to difficulties.
F. Conclusion
Winick's framework provides a valuable focus on the medical and
behavioral science context in which the boundaries of civil commit-
ment will be established. His framework, however, is ambivalent
about the role of the state's parens patriae interests in commitments
and about the level at which medical discourse enters his analysis. If
the parens patriae power plays a central role, then Winick has diffi-
culty explaining the social control role for the mental health system.
Winick's framework helps expose the danger in using aparens patriae
explanation to justify social control intrusions on liberty.
I suggest that the major error in Winick's framework is that it uses
an endogenous approach to seek limits on police power commitments.
A more profitable approach seeks those limits by examining the role
the civil commitment system plays in broader institutions of social
control. Elsewhere I have suggested that police power commitments
are justified, as well as limited, by an analysis of the state's interest in
vindicating its police power. The basic limiting principle requires the
state to show a compelling reason to justify its abandonment of the
primary system for social control (the criminal justice system) for the
alternate system (the civil commitment system). Mental impairment
113. This does indeed seem to be the position that Winick is advocating.
Under this requirement [therapeutic appropriateness], which seems im-
plicit in Foucha, [police power] civil commitment would be impermissible
for individuals who would realize no therapeutic benefit from hospitali-
zation.... For mentally ill people who are dangerous to others and
whose psychiatric condition would benefit from hospitalization, the ther-
apeutic basis for their hospitalization might justify their involuntary
commitment, even though nonmentally ill people predicted to be danger-
ous are generally not subject to this intervention.
Winick, supra note 7, at 585.
114. For my explication of what the other constraints on police power commitments
ought to be, see Janus, Preventing, supra note 5, at 208-12.
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that removes an individual beyond the reach of the criminal system
provides just that sort of interest-enhancing reason for the state.115
V. SCHOPP: DERIVING POLICE POWER LIMITS FROM
MENTAL STATUS
Where Winick's analysis has as its core the premise that civil com-
mitment is essentially medical, Schopp's analysis rests on the way in
which civil commitment impairs the status of mentally competent in-
dividuals. I will comment on four aspects of Schopp's analysis. First,
I will examine Schopp's choice of explicandun. I will suggest that
Schopp is ambivalent about whether police power commitment is es-
sentially medical and about whether the limits of police power com-
mitments should be derived either endogenously from such an essence
or exogenously from its relationship to the broader institutions of so-
cial control.
Second, I will examine Schopp's discussion of the proper level at
which medical and behavioral science discourse should be linked with
the legal analysis. Schopp relegates the discourse of medicine and sci-
ence to a descriptive level in an effort to insure that the bounds of civil
commitment are derived from legal, rather than medical, principles. I
suggest some cautions about Schopp's analysis.
Third, I discuss how Schopp's framework deals with the relation-
ship between the social control and health care aspects of the mental
health system. In this context I explore Schopp's ambivalence about
the medical nature of police power commitments. Finally, I look at the
way in which Schopp addresses the critical step of locating the limits
of police power commitments. It is here that Schopp most clearly re-
lies on a rights/status analysis. I argue that this sort of analysis does
not provide for well limited police power commitments.
A. Schopp's Choice of Explicandum
As set out above,116 the choice of explicandum-that which is
"given" and in need of clarification-is a critical step in the task of
defining the boundaries of civil commitment. Winick's focus on "psy-
chiatric institutionalization" led him to an explication that relied
heavily on medical discourse and left unanswered the question, posed
by contemporary sex offender commitment legislation, of whether
commitments outside the limits of psychiatric treatment are
permissible.
Schopp frames his inquiry in broader terms. He chooses to expli-
cate the "mental health" power of the state. The question left open by
115. See id.
116. See supra section II.A and accompanying notes.
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this explicandum, perhaps foreclosed by Winicks analysis, is whether
"legal mental illness" can properly be expanded beyond psychiatric ill-
nesses. Schopp's analysis focuses on both the extension and the limi-
tation of police power commitments. Schopp shifts the nature of his
explicandum in a small but important way by moving from one topic
to the other. In determining the extension (what conditions are in-
cluded), Schopp adopts an exogenous approach to the explication; that
is, police power commitments complement the criminal justice system
and the scope of the latter defines the breadth of the former. In dis-
cussing the limits on police power commitments, however, he switches
to an endogenous approach, seeking the limits through an analysis of
the essence of the mental health power itself. As I show below, this
switch reflects an ambivalence about the role that health care plays in
police power commitments.
A complete discussion of the switched context for explication re-
quires a fuller understanding of Schopp's conceptual framework, to
which this Article now turns.
B. Levels of Discourse and the Law-Science Linkage
Schopp's framework for finding the boundaries of civil commitment
sorts out the roles played by law, on the one hand, and by medicine
and science on the other. His framework is designed to elevate the
role of law in the boundary setting. The role of science and medicine is
intended to be descriptive rather than normative.
Schopp analyzes "mental illness" as three separate concepts: psy-
chological dysfunction; psychological disorder or diagnosis; and legal
mental illness. The first, psychological dysfunction, is a component
part of the second and third concepts. "Dysfunctions" are "impair-
ments" of "particular psychological processes."117 "Diagnoses," the
second category, are "names for clinically recognizable and significant
patterns of impaired processes that occur relatively frequently."118 In
other words, "diagnoses" are clinically (medically) useful patterns of
"dysfunctions." The third category, "legal mental illness," refers to
"any pattern or type of psychological impairment that meets the legal
standard."1l 9 Thus, "legal mental illness" means legally significant
patterns of "dysfunctions."
This analysis provides a useful tool for explication because it mini-
mizes any a priori connection between concepts defined in medical
terms (diagnoses) and those defined in legal terms ("legal mental ill-
ness"). Schopp's analysis facilitates legal control in the boundary set-
117. Schopp, supra note 5, at 171.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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ting by acknowledging that legal categories may differ from medical
categories. "[Dliagnosis," for Schopp, "carries no legal significance."'120
The reason for this is that medical diagnostic categories are devel-
oped in a different context and for a different purpose than the catego-
ries of "legal mental illness." Medical diagnostic schemes are
generally categorical.121 All categorization distorts the complete pic-
ture because it discards potentially significant information.122 Medi-
cal categorization cuts along lines that arguably are useful for clinical
and research purposes, but not necessarily for legal ones. 123
Dysfunction is a logically simpler concept than diagnosis. Dysfunc-
tion entails neither the notion of pattern nor the thresholds necessary
for clinical categorization. Dysfunctions can be expressed dimension-
ally, thus preserving some of the information lost in diagnosis.324 The
information lost in medical diagnosis may well be precisely the infor-
mation that is critical for legal purposes.125 The dimensional descrip-
tions of dysfunction can be fit more accurately into the relevant legal
categories. For these reasons, use of a discourse of dysfunction rather
than diagnosis allows a greater level of legal control.
Schopp's insistence on a discourse of dysfunction should allow for
greater legal control in a second way. Expert testimony of mental
health professionals is likely to be distorted not only by the categories
of medicine and science, but also by their own "social preferences."12 6
120. Id. at 172.
121. MILLON, supra note 30, at 14-16.
122. See JACOB BRONOWSKi, THE OsGiNs OF KNOWLEDGE AND IMAGINATION 79-80
(1979)(discussing the loss of knowledge that arises from the inevitable cutting of
the universe into categories); Thomas A. Widiger et al., The DSM-III-R Personal-
ity Disorders: An Overview, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATY 786 (1988); Thomas A.
Widiger & Timothy J. Trull, Personality Disorders and Violence, in VIOLENCE AND
MENTAL DisORUDxs: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT 216 (John Monahan &
Henry J. Steadman eds., 1994)(discussing how diagnostic classifications may dis-
card information critical for prediction of violence).
123. See AMrmICAN PSYCHIArIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DisoRDERs: DSM-m-R 8 (3rd ed. 1987)(noting that the "use of this man-
ual for nonclinical purposes, such as determination of legal responsibility ...
must be critically examined in each instance within the appropriate institutional
context").
124. See MmLON, supra note 30, at 14-16; Allen Frances, M.D., The DSMIIIPersonal-
ity Disorders Section: A Commentary, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1050, 1051
(1980)(discussing advantages of a dimensional system); Paul E. Meehl, Boot-
straps Taxonometrics, 50 AM. PSYCHOL. 266, 266 (1995)(noting the loss of infor-
mation in the use of categorical discourse and questioning whether the "payoff in
ease of communication makes up for the disadvantages").
125. W.M. Grove, When Is a Diagnosis Worth Making? A Comparison of Two Statisti-
cal Prediction Strategies, 68 PSYCHOL. REP. 3, 17 (1991).
126. Michael Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47
U. MIAMI L. REv. 625, 643-44 (1993).
Experts' testimony is premised on individual value systems (i.e., the ex-
pert "knows" what's "really best" for the patient), or on cognitive distor-
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"Dysfimction" is a more factual, less conceptualized level of discourse
than diagnosis. The factual aspect of dysfunction testimony is amena-
ble to challenge by standard advocacy tools available to "lay" lawyers
and judges, such as cross-examination based on documentary evi-
dence. In the end, the expert must be able to point to the behaviors of
the individual that justify finding a dysfunction. The witness' "social
preferences" are much more difficult to ferret out of the higher level
diagnosis discourse because diagnostic "impressions" come from the
clinician's "judgment," a process with no stable anchor in the observa-
ble world of behavior.
Winick and Schopp apparently disagree about the appropriate
level of discourse. Winick's analysis, as discussed above, turns heavily
on etiology and treatability, both of which are the kinds of information
reflected in medical diagnostic categories.' 2 7 The medical notion of
"illness" also plays into Winickls analysis.12s Winick's adoption of
such a high level of medical discourse is a corollary of his premise that
commitment is an "essentially medical" intervention. Schopp's insis-
tence on using science at a simpler, more descriptive level is evidence
that he sees the medical nature of commitment as less central than
does Winick. I return to this aspect of Schopp's analysis below.12 9
Here I want to raise three notes of caution about Schopp's basically
sound plan to limit science and medicine to a descriptive role.130
First, it would be a mistake to assume that the discourse of dysfunc-
tion is itself free of normative conceptualization. While dysfunction is
a logically less complex notion than diagnosis, even dysfunction neces-
sarily entails judgments that are, or may be, of important legal signifi-
tions (i.e., the last time that the expert recommended release at an
involuntary civil commitment review hearing, the patient subsequently
was found homeless in the town's rail station, and the local press cover-
age focused on the hapless expert's trial testimony as the dispositive an-
tecedent 'cause' of the subsequent event), and, as a result, one of the
most basic and important linchpins of the forensic mental health system
comes seriously loose from its moorings.
Id. at 640-41.
127. Common etiology and common response to treatment are two factors that may be
reflected in the classification of a set of conditions as a disease or illness entity.
See STUART A. KInK & HERB KUTCHINs, ThE SELLING OF DSM: Th Romic OF
SCIENCE iN PsycmATRY 21, 235 (1992); R. Rogers & K. L. Dion, Rethinking the
DSM III-R Diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder, 19 BULL. Am. AcAD. PsY-
cmATRY L. 21, 23 (1991)(arguing that diagnoses should predict outcomes).
128. See supra section IV.D and accompanying notes.
129. See infra section V.D.
130. Schopp's views about the irrelevance of diagnosis echo a position set forth in Ste-
phen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental
Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 527 (1978). Morse's views are criticized in Rich-
ard Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in
the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REv. 427,
466-73 (1980), which foreshadows some of the cautions articulated here.
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cance. For example, there is a debate about whether psychopathy,
and the constellation of psychological characteristics that it describes,
is a "normal" evolutionary response to certain environmental condi-
tions.131 If dysfunction is defined (as it often is) as the failure of a
psychological mechanism to function as it is "supposed" to function,
132
then psychopathy would not count as a dysfunction.
Further, the notion of psychological "function" is itself a construc-
tion. There is, for example, a debate about the meaning of "voli-
tion."133 Psychological testimony about impairment of volition 34
sounds like description, but actually encodes complex categorical con-
structions. Finally, the notion of dysfunction often entails a judgment
about "capacity" or "incapacity."' 3 5 These terms, in some circum-
stances, stand for controversial resolutions of complex conceptual and
value problems.'3 6 Thus, it would be wrong to assume that reliance
on "dysfunction" discourse removes all concern about subsurface dis-
tortion of legal concepts.
There is a second set of concerns about the focus on dysfunction
and the claim that diagnosis is irrelevant to legal mental illness.
These are perhaps more fundamental than those just alluded to,
which can be overcome simply by moving along the axis of complexity
until one reaches the level of descriptiveness that reveals the informa-
tion that is relevant to legal determinations. The second set of issues
is this: there may be a medical concept of "illness" or "disorder" that is
central to the limits of civil commitment.
131. See ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MoRAeL ANIMAL 273-74 (1994); Quinsey, supra note 96,
at 117; Wakefield, supra note 92, at 383.
132. See Wakefield, supra note 92, at 383.
133. Compare GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF Mum 62 (1949)(volition is a concept
with no utility), and ROBERT F. SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE Psy-
CHOLOGY OF CRnNAL RESPONSImrrY 202 (1991)(defining volition), and Stephen
J. Morse, Causation, Compulsion, and Involuntariness, 22 BuLL. AM. AcAD. PSY-
cHIATRY L. 159, 171 (1994)(summarizing various views on volition and will), with
MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT & CRnmE 134 (Tony Honore & Joseph Raz eds., 1993),
and Julius Kuhl and Jftrgen Beckmann, Historical Perspectives in the Study of
Action Control, in ACTION CONTROL: FROM COGNITION TO BEHAVIOR 89, 89-90 (Ju-
lius Kuhl & Juzrgen Beckmann eds., 1985)(noting that some authors define voli-
tion in terms of the psychological processes mediating decisions; others define
volition in terms of processes that "mediate the maintenance and enactment of
decisions"). See also Charles M. Culver & Bernard Gert, Volitional Disabilities,
in PHILOSOPHY IN MEDICINE: CONCEPTUAL AND ETHICAL IssUEs IN MEDICINE AND
PsYcHIATRY, at 109, 110 (1982)(defining "volitional abilities").
134. See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 1994)(defining legal mental ill-
ness as entailing a "volitional dysfunction").
135. See Schopp, supra note 5, at 174.
136. See, e.g., DANEL C. DENNETr, ELBow ROOM: THE VARIETIES OF FREE WIt. WORTH
WANTING 133 (1984); Culver & Gert, supra note 133, at 110; Timothy Duggan &
Bernard Gert, Voluntary Abilities, 4 AM. PHIL. Q. 127, 127-28 (1967).
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Let me provide two examples. Winick's analysis strongly focused
on the "traditional notion of illness." This is unsurprising in light of
his principle of therapeutic appropriateness. By insisting that proper
subjects for commitment exhibit only conditions for which there is ap-
propriate treatment, Winick wants to capture one of the pieces of in-
formation that makes a diagnosis clinically useful (and perhaps
valid)-information about treatment. 13 7 Thus, for Winick, it appears
to matter whether a condition is really a medical illness.a8s
Further, it may matter at some rather deep level of our jurispru-
dence whether the condition suffered by the individual is simply a bit
more or less of some characteristic shared by all humans, or, in con-
trast, represents some "real" categorical difference in kind from the
rest of the species.1 3 9 A number of courts upholding sex offender com-
mitment statutes have emphasized that the condition identified in sex
offender commitment statutes is a real, diagnosable condition.14o Is
this but the surface manifestation of some deep notion in our jurispru-
dence that allows us to treat individuals with "real differences" less
well than those who, while possessing various characteristics in vary-
ing degrees, are nonetheless of the "normal type"?141 This topic de-
serves further study. The only point here is to raise the issue so that
the adoption of a dysfunction discourse does not further bury it.
There is a third way in which diagnostic categories quite legiti-
mately may be relevant to legal proceedings. Expert testimony by
mental health professionals in legal proceedings often involves predic-
137. KIK & KuTrcmNs, supra note 127, at 235 ("ie ostensible clinical purpose for
making a formal psychiatric diagnosis is to guide the choice of therapeutic
intervention.").
138. Kirk and Kutchins describe the "credo" that guided the development of modern
psychiatric nosologies. Under this "credo," "[pisychiatry is a branch of medicine
.... Psychiatry treats people who are sick.... There is a boundary between the
normal and the sick" Id. at 50 tbl.3.1.
139. Quinsey, supra note 96, at 122. Cf. MULoN, supra note 30, at 5. Millon criticizes
the view that
syndromes of psychopathology [are] one or another variant of a disease,
that is, some 'foreign' entity or lesion that intrudes insidiously within
the person to undermine his or her so-called normal functions. The
archaic notion that all mental disorders represent external intrusions or
internal disease processes is an offshoot of prescientific ideas such as
demons or spirits ....
Id.
140. See, e.g.,In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d, 910, 915 (Minn. 1994)(holding that "the 'psy-
chopathic personality' is an identifiable and documentable violent sexually devi-
ant condition or disorder"); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1017 (Wash. 1993)(holding
that "[tlhe sexually violent predator condition is not only recognized, but treata-
ble and capable of diagnosis").
141. In State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, the Minnesota Supreme Court referred
to the sex offenders subject to civil commitment as a "type[] of 'unnaturals.'"
State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 287 N.W. 297,299 (Minn. 1939), affd, 309
U.S. 270 (1940).
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tion and postdiction-inferences, drawn from the current observations
of an individual concerning her past or future behaviors and mental
capacities. Inferences of this sort lead to a process of reasoning that
goes up and down the "arch of knowledge,"142 i.e., from specific obser-
vations about this individual (that would probably correspond to
Schopp's "dysfunctions"), to general principles (often statements about
diagnostic categories), and then back down to the specifics (predictions
or postdictions about the individual's condition or behavior at some
other point in time).143
Diagnoses are one of the major repositories for the accumulation of
clinical knowledge.144 Indeed, one measure of the "validity" of diag-
nostic categories concerns how useful they are in predicting or infer-
ring the unknown aspects of the individual from the observed
aspects. 145 Strictly speaking, the specifics, not the general principles,
are matched with the legal standards. But it would be a mistake to
hold that diagnosis is "irrelevant" since it seems to have a large, if
only intermediate, role in ascertaining legally relevant facts. Given
this role in prediction and postdiction, it might be prudent for a legis-
142. DAVrD OLDROYD, THE ARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 13 (1986).
143. See Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with
Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1427
(1979)(noting that even decisions that make use of individualized "clinical" judg-
ment rely on categorical information about the "class" to which the individual is
thought to belong).
144. See Paul E. Meehl & Robert R. Golden, Taxometric Methods, in HANDBOOK OF
RESEARCH METHODS IN CLICAL PSYCHOLOGY 127, 130 (Philip C. Kendall &
James N. Butcher eds., 1982). Meehl and Golden argue that "taxons" or diagno-
ses are used to
summarize a great deal of our knowledge, including low probability or
highly problematic conjectural knowledge about a patient .... It is
doubtful that clinicians could talk with each other if they were strictly
forbidden to employ such summarizing rubrics as this, although the dan-
gers of reification when the entity has no existence, as well as premature
diagnostic closure by one's adoption of the semantics, are well known.
Id. At least in certain circumstances, it is knowledge of active symptoms (dys-
functions?) rather than diagnoses that allows for prediction. See Edward P. Mul-
vey, Assessing the Evidence of a Link Between Mental Illness and Violence, 45
Hosp. & CommuNrrY PSYCHIATRY 663, 665 (1994). In some circumstances, more-
over, diagnostic thinking impairs, rather than assists, prediction. See generally
W.M. Grove, When Is a Diagnosis Worth Making? A Comparison of Two Statisti-
cal Prediction Strategies, 69 PSYCHOL. EP. 3, 3-17 (1991).
145. KnK & KUTCHINS, supra note 127, at 29. See also Edgar F. Borgatta & Marie L.
Borgatta, Validity, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIOLOGY 2217, 2219 (Edgar F.
Borgotta & Marie L. Borgotta eds., 1992)(defining predictive validity); Grant T.
Harris et al., Violent Recidivism of Mentally Disordered Offenders: The Develop-
ment of a Statistical Prediction Instrument, 20 CnM. JusT. & BEHAV. 315, 325
(1993)(noting that predictive validity is a crucial psychometric issue); Robert A.
Prentky et al., Predictive Validity of Lifestyle Impulsivity for Rapists, 22 Cnme.
JUST. & BEHAv. 106, 128 (1995).
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lature to require the presence of a "valid" (medically recognized) disor-
der as a necessary condition for commitment.1 46
C. Legal Mental Illness as Incompetence in a
Particular Context
Schopp's method is to provide a usable interface between law and
psychology by expressing legal standards in the language of dysfunc-
tion or impairment. At the heart of his explication, Schopp derives
these legal standards from the internal logic of the two legal con-
texts-the criminal justice system and the mental health system.
Schopp demonstrates that the fundamental nature of the criminal
justice system entails the notions of responsibility and competency to
stand trial, and that these can be expressed as sets of mental compe-
tencies. Dysfunctions that impair these mental competencies render a
person "ineligible" for the criminal justice system.1 4 7 I shall refer to
146. It seems quite clear that courts operate heuristically in the mental health area.
That is, they use "shortcuts" to manipulate the complexities of mental health law
and social science that underlies it. See Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and
the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69
NEB. L. REv. 3 (1990). Laws need to be written with that propensity in mind. In
civil commitments, predictions of future harmful behavior play a central role, but
the measurement of the validity of predictions is somewhat complex and likely to
be overshadowed by more vivid evidence. See Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl,
Assessing the Legal Standard for Predictions of Dangerousness in Sex Offender
Commitment Proceedings, 2 PSYCHOL., PuB. Poi'Y & L. (forthcoming 1997)(manu-
script at 2-7, on file with the author)(describing methods for measuring validity of
predictions); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use
Of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. Rav. 559, 576 (1987)(discussing use of statis-
tics in litigation).
Requiring a medically recognized diagnosis as a condition for commitment
may be a shorthand, or heuristic, for predictive validity that courts can use and
understand. Though flawed as a tool for predictions, it may be a more effective
legislative strategy for obtaining valid predictions than a naked statutory provi-
sion mandating validity in prediction.
147. Punishment is limited to those who deserve it, and "a retributive system reaf-
firms the moral force of the criminal law." Schopp, supra note 5, at 178. Thus,
criminal punishment "applies uniquely to those who possess the capacities neces-
sary to function within such a rule-based system. The system expresses respect
for these persons by presenting them with the rules and allowing them to guide
their own conduct by exercising their capacities for practical reasoning." Id.
Legal mental illness in this context is "psychological impairment that under-
mines these capacities, preventing the person from guiding his or her conduct
according to the rules through the capacities ordinarily available to the compe-
tent practical reasoner." Id. at 179.
Note that "competent moral agents" are those who
have the ability to comprehend and conform to a system of rules and
punishments without having to actually experience the consequences.
Competent moral agents are those who have the capacities needed to
direct their conduct in conformity with a legal or moral standard by en-
gaging in a process of practical reasoning and deliberation.
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this set of competencies as CL-competencies ("criminal law competen-
cies"), and those who lack them as CL-incompetent. People who are
CL-incompetent have "legal mental illness" in the criminal justice
context.
Schopp then turns to the mental health system, correctly pointing
out that the mental health system has dual functions in our society (as
well as in our history). These functions are social control and health
care. He suggests that this duality corresponds to the two powers sup-
porting mental health commitment-the police power and the parens
patriae power.148 Schopp observes that the characteristics (including
boundaries and criteria) of health care commitments (supported by
the parens patriae power) may be different from those of social-control
commitments (supported by the police power).149
Schopp argues that a fundamental value underlying our health
care system (including the health care aspect of the mental health sys-
tem) is the right to act autonomously, which he calls "sovereignty.'15o
The area of sovereignty extends only to "self-regarding life deci-
sions."151 In general, health care decisions fall within the area of sov-
ereignty, and people have the right to informed consent about their
own health care.15 2
Some people do not have the ability to exercise their "autonomous
capacities." Thus, they lack the "necessary condition for sover-
eignty."153 Schopp argues that "[a] legal standard of competence that
deprives these individuals of the right to informed consent and the
concomitant right to refuse treatment does not violate the principle of
autonomy."154 I will refer to the competencies that are a precondition
to the exercise of autonomy, and thus of sovereignty, as S-competen-
cies. S-incompetence is a condition for legal mental illness in the con-
text of parens patriae commitments for the involuntary provision of
mental health care.1 5 5
Three points should be emphasized. First, note the differences be-
tween CL-competency and S-competency. The former refers to mental
capacities needed for an individual to be held responsible for criminal
actions. The latter refers to the capacities needed for an individual to
Id. at 178.
148. Id. at 183.
149. Buchanan and Brock also expressed this insight. See BucHANAN & BRocsc, supra
note 5, at 312.
150. Schopp, supra note 5, at 173.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 172. 'The moral principle of autonomy as a right to self-determination
within a sphere of personal sovereignty supports the right to informed consent."
Id.
153. Id. at 174.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 183.
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exercise control in a sphere that is self-regarding. Second, the two
standards for competency may well be different. Thus, conditions that
render an individual CL-incompetent may not affect the capacities
that are necessary for the exercise of sovereignty in self-regarding ar-
eas and so do not render the person S-incompetent.156
Third, the principles of sovereignty and autonomy do not reach be-
havior that is outside of the area of self-regard. In particular, "sover-
eignty" does not give an individual the right to threaten or harm
others. As Schopp points out, legal institutions can "monitor and in-
tervene in conduct that threatens harm to others.... Such behavior
does not constitute the exercise of sovereignty because it extends be-
yond the essentially self-regarding domain."157
Having established this framework, Schopp's analysis now turns to
the central problem of finding the boundaries of police power commit-
ments. It is clear enough where Schopp wants to end up on this ques-
tion. It is to be CL-incompetence that distributes individuals to the
two branches of the social control system, criminal and mental health.
Harmful behavior of CL-competent individuals is addressed in the
criminal system and harmful behavior of CL-incompetent individuals
is addressed in the police power commitment system. Schopp's analy-
sis contemplates a nonoverlapping, gapless boundary between the two
systems of social control.5S
Schopp's analysis must answer two questions. The first is why all
CL-incompetent individuals are properly subject to social control com-
mitment. The second is why only CL-incompetent individuals are sub-
ject to this form of commitment. The first of these questions (the "gap"
question) is easier; the second ("overlap") is more difficult.
Schopp addresses the "gap" problem in three steps. First, legal
mental illness renders the individual "inappropriate" for the criminal
justice system because subjecting those who are CL-incompetent to
the criminal justice system would "dilute the moral force of the crimi-
nal law by punishing those for whom punishment is not justified."l59
Second, he asserts that the system of social control must be compre-
hensive..60 That is, there must be an "alternative institution" to ad-
dress dangerous behavior left unaddressed through the criminal
justice system. Third, Schopp prescribes that the mental health sys-
tem complements the criminal justice system. In other words, the
156. Id. at 182-83.
157. Id. at 175 n.49.
158. "The mental health component of the institution of social control, rather than the
criminal justice component, applies to all and only those who suffer legal mental
illness undermining the capacity to direct their conduct [i.e., to CL-incompetent
individuals]...." Id. at 181 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 179.
160. Id.
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mental health system addresses all social control confinements that
are outside the scope of the criminal system.
Each of these three steps is necessary to Schopp's conclusion,
which is that all CL-incompetent individuals are properly addressed
by the mental health power of the state. Note that Winick almost cer-
tainly rejects that conclusion, and with it, the third of Schopp's steps.
Winick's analysis contemplates the possible existence of individuals
who are criminally excused, yet not committable because their condi-
tions are untreatable. Further, Winick only reluctantly and ambigu-
ously embraces the second step of Schopp's analysis by postulating
some form of nonmental health preventive detention for those who fall
between the criminal justice and mental health systems.161
This discussion illustrates the difference between Schopp's and
Winick's frameworks for explicating legal mental illness. Schopp's ob-
servation that social control civil commitment should be viewed as an-
alytically related more to the criminal justice system than to parens
patriae commitments162 emphasizes two key distinctions: (1) the cri-
teria for social control commitments might differ from the criteria for
parens patriae commitments 163 and (2) the criteria for police power
commitments complement those in the criminal system.164
Note that in this explication, the "mental health" aspect of police
power commitments is a dependent variable (a result of the explica-
tion) rather than one of the independent variables (a "given" in the
argument). Under this explication, police power commitments are
"mental health" commitments because criminal-excuse conditions are
based on mental incapacities. This explication results in a "gapless"
boundary between the criminal and mental health systems.
In contrast, Winick's explication provides that the essentially med-
ical nature of civil commitment appears to be part of the explicandum
(a given). Winick's explication is entirely endogenous, deriving the
boundaries of civil commitment from the essential nature of commit-
ment as a medical intervention.
This distinction between the frameworks of the two writers, how-
ever, blurs as Schopp turns to his discussion of the limits on police
power commitments. When Schopp argues that only those who are
CL-incompetent may be committed under the police power, he appears
161. See supra Part IV and Winick's discussion about preventive detention.
162. Schopp writes:
[C]riminal incarceration and police power commitment serve as compli-
mentary institutions within the police power category, serving the social
control finction for those who are (criminal incarceration) or are not (po-
lice power commitment) eligible to participate in the criminal justice
system.
Schopp, supra note 5, at 183.
163. Id. at 182.
164. Id.
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to argue that the limits of police power commitments arise from the
health care aspect of commitments.
D. The Health Care/Social Control Distinction: What Is
Their Relationship?
As mentioned above, Schopp's conceptual framework distinguishes
between two aspects of civil commitment, social control, and health
care. Schopp never explicitly states what he considers to be the rela-
tionship of the two. As I shall show below, the nature of this relation-
ship is critical, so it is worth contemplating how the two aspects might
be related and how Schopp's framework appears to arrange them.
Since this Article focuses on police power commitments, the key
question is whether, and in what sense, health care is a necessary
component of civil commitments. This question was addressed above
at some length in connection with the discussion of Winickls principle
of therapeutic appropriateness. 165 Winick's position that civil com-
mitment is "essentially medical," translated into Schopp's terms,
states that all commitments must exhibit the health care aspect.
Winick's conception of the health care aspect of civil commitment, at
least in its strong version,166 further characterizes civil commitment
health care as that which is (and therapeutically can be) involuntarily
administered. As I argued above, other possible conceptions of civil
commitment are available. For example, we can imagine civil commit-
ment in which health care, conceived quite broadly as including non-
medical forms of treatment, is offered to, but not forced on, those who
are committed. 167 Thus, we can contemplate at least three ways in
which the social control and health care functions might combine in
police power commitments. In the strongest form, health care is a
necessary condition and is forced involuntarily. In the weak form,
health care is an unnecessary component of commitments. In the in-
termediate combination, health care is necessary in the sense that it
must be offered, but commitments without health care are permissible
165. See supra section IV.B and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
167. Treatment for persons committed under Minnesota's sex offender commitment
laws is not "forced" provided the committed individual consents. See MINNESOTA
SEcuRrrY Hosp., SEX OFFENDER TREATmENT PROGRAm: PLAN, CONTENT AND SE-
QUENCE 7-8 ("Residents sign a consent form each trimester acknowledging their
awareness of limits to confidentiality and either consenting to, or refusing, treat-
ment in the program."). The Minnesota treatment program contemplates that
committed individuals will "voluntarily cooperate" with the program. See gener-
ally ST. PETER REG'L TREATMENT CTR., M NESOTA SEcURrrY Hosp., PsYcHO-
PATHc PERSONAL=Y SEX OFFENDER PROGRAM 1 (July 1993). Schopp
acknowledges that civil commitment may involve a "broad range of interven-
tions," apparently not limited to the organic treatments prescribed by Winick
Schopp, supra note 5, at 180.
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where the individual refuses the health care or where no appropriate
health care is available.
Now let us pinpoint where on this continuum Schopp's analysis
lands. Recall that Schopp defines legal mental illness for police power
commitments in terms of the criminal justice system. CL-incompe-
tence, rather than S-incompetence, is the standard for police power
commitments. CL-competence and S-competence are not identical.
Some CL-incompetent individuals are S-competent. Thus, under
Schopp's analysis, some individuals who are S-competent-able to ex-
ercise the capacities to act autonomously-will be committed to the
mental health system.
This result strongly suggests that Schopp rejects the strong posi-
tion on health care (that forced medical treatment is an "essential"
feature of commitment). Schopp instead would endorse, at most, the
intermediate position. The strong position would suggest that some S-
competent persons would be subjected to forced health care. This posi-
tion would clearly violate the basic principles of autonomy that
Schopp sets forth. Schopp rejects the notion that his framework will
result in the violation of the principles of autonomy: "The state can
respect individual sovereignty, yet retain legitimate authority to pre-
vent acts that extend beyond the sphere of sovereignty to harm
others."16 8 Here, Schopp is saying that "prevention," i.e., social con-
trol, can be exercised without violating sovereignty, an area that pro-
tects the individual's right to make autonomous decisions about
health care.
This analysis suggests that Schopp rejects Winick's position that
commitment is essentially medical. If commitment is essentially med-
ical, then the mere commitment of an S-competent individual would
amount to the autonomy-violating involuntary imposition of health
care. At a key point in his analysis, however, Schopp appears to fall
back on an argument that is much closer to Winick's position. It is to
that portion of the argument that I now turn.
E. Autonomy, Mental Competency, and the Limits on Social
Control: Do Some People Have a Diminished Right
to Be Treated as Persons?
Schopp seeks to establish that CL-competent and S-competent in-
dividuals ought not be addressed in the mental health system. Put
another way, Schopp argues that an individual whose criminal re-
sponsibility is not impaired and who is competent to decide about his
own health care should not be civilly committed. I wish to make three
points about Schopp's argument. First, I will suggest that Schopp re-
lies on a rights/status approach to make this argument. Second, I will
168. Schopp, supra note 5, at 175 n.49 (emphasis added).
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argue that Schopp's argument may contradict his earlier rejection of
the premise that civil commitment is essentially medical. Third, I will
argue that Schopp's rights/status-based approach fails to provide a
solid limitation for police power commitments.
The central force behind Schopp's limitations argument is that
commitment is inconsistent with the status or "standing" properly ac-
corded to competent individuals. Schopp argues that "[c]onsistent re-
spect for the principle of autonomy requires that those who qualify for
sovereignty be treated in a manner appropriate to that standing in all
social institutions."169 The corollary of this proposition is that those
who are incompetent lack such "standing" or status and thus may be
properly committed. This argument ties the limits of police power
commitments directly to the "status" of the individual. Those with a
particular status "qualify" for certain rights; those who lack that sta-
tus do not.
Contrast this argument with Schopp's argument about the exten-
sion of commitments. In the extension argument, he focuses on the
interests of the state and the functioning of the criminal justice sys-
tem. It is the state's inability to apply criminal sanctions to CL-incom-
petent individuals that justifies the use of civil commitment as a social
control mechanism. Schopp then changes focus from the state's inter-
ests to the individual's right to be treated in a particular manner.
Those with the requisite mental capacities have the right to be treated
as responsible persons in the criminal justice system; those without
such capacities have a diminished set of rights and are "relegated" to
the mental health system.
The cornerstone of Schopp's limitations argument is that commit-
ting competent individuals is inconsistent with their standing as au-
tonomous individuals who qualify for sovereignty. Let us examine
what this claim means and entails. Recall first the definitions of au-
tonomy and sovereignty. Autonomy has several meanings for Schopp.
Here, he appears to be referring to "autonomous capacities,"170 by
which he means the psychological capacities necessary to "qualify for
sovereignty."17 ' "Sovereignty" is the right to act in the context of self-
regarding decisions, such as decisions about one's own health care. In-
dividuals are not sovereign with respect to the other-regarding deci-
sions involved in the system of social control. In Schopp's framework,
169. Id. at 181.
170. Schopp argues that subjecting CL-competent individuals to the mental health
system would "sacrifice the value of autonomy by treating those who are eligible
to participate in the criminal justice component as if they lacked the autonomous
capacities they actually possess." Id. at 182.
171. Id. at 174.
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states have the right to prevent actions that harm or threaten harm to
others,172 and such prevention does not violate the value of autonomy.
Given this framework, civil commitment is inconsistent with au-
tonomy only to the extent that its intervention extends to areas, such
as health care, that are self-regarding. If the health care aspect of
civil commitment is not imposed, then commitment, at least in this
analysis, does not violate the value of autonomy. Conversely, Schopp's
assertion that the principle of autonomy is violated suggests he con-
templates that civil commitment always entails forced health care.173
In short, the autonomy argument appears to entail, at its base, a reli-
ance on an "essentially medical" conception of civil commitment. As
suggested above, this appears inconsistent with other aspects of
Schopp's framework.174
Perhaps my critique reads Schopp too narrowly. Perhaps he really
intends to argue that social-control commitment treats CL-competent
individuals as CL-incompetent, i.e., as if they lacked the competencies
to be treated as responsible individuals in the criminal law system.
It might be shown, for example, that social-control civil commit-
ments characterize criminal behavior as "caused" by a mental disorder
rather than chosen, and thereby treat individuals as objects for exami-
nation rather than as moral actors.' 75 But this argument appears to
be based on the accident of the current conceptualization of civil com-
mitment. While it is true that civil commitment laws often are framed
in terms of the psychological causation of behavior, a sophisticated un-
derstanding of such causation shows that it is not necessarily incon-
sistent with CL-competence. All behavior is psychologically caused;
causal explanations are not inconsistent with explanations of behavior
based on the exercise of choice.' 76 Civil commitment laws could be
172. Id. at 175. 'The state can respect individual sovereignty, yet retain legitimate
authority to prevent acts that extend beyond the sphere of sovereignty to harm
others." Id. at 175 n.49.
173. Cf Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988)(contemplating a system in
which the confinement decision and the forced treatment decision are made inde-
pendently and on different grounds).
174. See infra Part VI.
175. Schopp argues that addressing CL-competent persons within the mental health
system "distorts the conventional public morality by misrepresenting the stan-
dards of competence and culpability. This distortion denigrates the defendants,
misleads the public, and undermines the moral force of the larger institution of
social control." Schopp, supra note 5, at 181. See also, Janus, Preventing, supra
note 5, at 212; John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Statute:
Law or Lottery? A Response to Professor Brooks, 15 U. PUGET SouND L. REv. 755,
767 (1992)(arguing that legal mental illness "assumes there is a causative defect
in cognitive, emotional, or volitional processes that can be diagnosed and, in most
cases, treated").
176. See Morse, supra note 133, at 162. See generally Icek Ajzen, From Intentions to
Actions: A Theory of Planned Behavior, in HisTORIcAL PERSPECTIVES IN T=
STmUY oF ACTION CONTROL 12 (Julius Kuhl et al. eds., 1985)(discussing the pre-
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rewritten, it might be argued, to emphasize the coexistence of patho-
logical cause and free choice.177 The design of the social control aspect
of the mental heath system is contingent and changeable. It is not
inevitable that this function should emphasize psychological causality
rather than moral responsibility. A design could clearly deliver the
messages of both responsibility and psychological dysfunction.17s The
task here is to explicate the role of mental disorder, not describe how
it currently functions in civil commitment. The accidents of current
commitment schemes should not govern the constitutional boundaries
of the state's police power. To merely say that social-control commit-
ment treats competent people as incompetent is an oversimplification
since it treats them as "incompetent" only if we say it does.
One could suggest a deeper way in which CL-competent individ-
ual's capacities-the capacities to deliberate and follow rules-are
"sacrificed" if those individuals are addressed by the mental health
system. This argument does not stem from the labels of the mental
health system, but rather from its structure. As Professor Underwood
observed, confining people on the basis of predictions of their bad be-
havior violates the principle of autonomy because it "denies [them] the
opportunity to choose to avoid those crimes." 179 According to this ar-
gument, the structure of the mental health system is incompatible
with responsibility because it deprives individuals the "choice" to fol-
low the rules. The system is essentially preventive and forward look-
ing, rather than punitive and backward looking.180
diction of volitional behavior through an understanding of its "psychological
determinants").
177. Even under current law, the language of "choice" figures prominently in sex of-
fender commitments. For example, inRydberg v. Gomez, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals cited the individual's "refusal to participate in sex offender treatment" as
one of the grounds for denying his petition for discharge. Rydberg v. Gomez, No.
C7-96-883, 1996 LEXIS 1086 at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996). And consider the fol-
lowing description of persons who are subject to Minnesota sex offender commit-
ment law: "They may choose to commit harmful acts even if they know that the
acts are wrong because their mental disorder causes them to act." Brief for Re-
spondent Ramsey County at 13, In re Linehan (II), 577 N.W.2d 171 (Minn.
1996)(No. C1-95-2022). The Minnesota Attorney General's Brief in Linehan 11
characterized the state's Sexually Dangerous Persons Act as aimed at mentally
disordered sexual predators "whose mental disorders cause them to 'choose' to
commit sexual assaults." Brief for Respondent State of Minnesota at 15, In re
Linehan (II), 557 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1996)(No. C1-95-2022).
178. Sex offender treatment programs often emphasize the personal accountability of
the patient. See, e.g., MINNESOTA SEcunrrY Hosp., SEx OFFENDER TREATMENT
PROGRAM: PI"A, CONTENT AND SEQUENCE, supra note 167, at 4. The first of 12
listed "treatment goals" is "[aiccepting responsibility for sexual behavior without
cognitive distortion." Id.
179. Underwood, supra note 143, at 1414.
180. See id.
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This is, of course, an accurate characterization of civil commit-
ment. Further, it is not simply an accident of the current incarnation
of commitment laws. At its essence, commitment is preventive. The
bite in this argument arises from the comparison to the criminal law.
The criminal justice system, it is argued, gives competent rule-follow-
ers the opportunity to follow or break the rule and provides negative
consequences when the decision is to break the rule. This is the para-
digm that gives meaning to the notion of criminal responsibility.
But this argument proves too much. Many structures in our soci-
ety remove the opportunity to break the rules. The government erects
fences, locks doors, screens for guns and bombs, bans imports, and in
many other ways restricts the choices of individuals. Like civil com-
mitment, these restrictions prevent, rather than punish, harmful be-
haviors. The criminal justice system itself is highly preventive. Many
criminal punishment systems are designed to calibrate the period of
incapacitation to future dangerousness, rather than to the magnitude
of the crime.18 1 Schopp would have to explain how civil commitment
incapacitation is less consistent with responsibility than criminal law
incapacitation.38 2
It might be argued that prevention in the criminal justice system
differs from prevention in the civil commitment system because crimi-
nal preventive confinement is deserved, whereas the confinement in
civil commitments is not based on a desert justification.183 The crimi-
nal system, based on desert, treats people as ends in themselves,
rather than a means to an end.' 8 4 The mental health system is not
181. See Michael Tonry, Prediction and Classification: Legal and Ethical Issues, 9
CR=E & JusT. 367, 373 (1987). There appears to be nothing unconstitutional in
basing pre- or post-trial decisions in criminal cases on predictions of
dangerousness.
182. Indeed, Underwood recites arguments that prevention strategies in the criminal
law are inconsistent with "autonomy." Underwood, supra note 143, at 1418.
183. See, e.g., In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 998 (Wash. 1993)("Although the scheme here
does involve an affirmative restraint, the civil commitment goals of incapacita-
tion and treatment are distinct from punishment, and have been so regarded his-
torically."). See also State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 287 N.W. 297, 300
(Minn. 1939), affd, 309 U.S. 270 (1940)("In the interest of humanity and for the
protection of the public, persons [with psychopathic personalities] should be given
treatment and confined for that purpose rather than for the purpose of
punishment.").
184. See Tonry, supra note 181, at 385, for a more sophisticated discussion of this
issue. Not all theorists would agree that the severity or length of punishment
must be based on a retributivist theory of desert. Tonry describes H.L.A. Hart's
"middle way" as allowing a utilitarian calculus to measure the severity of punish-
ment, while insisting on a retributivist desert-based theory in the determination
of "liability" for punishment. Id. Schopp appears to adopt Hart's approach: "[A]
theory qualifies as retributive in this minimal sense if it limits punishment to
those who are culpable by requiring desert as a constraint on the manner in
which society pursues its deterrent purposes through punishment." Schopp,
supra note 5, at 177. See generally John Monahan, The Case for Prediction in the
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based on desert. The deprivation of liberty in police power commit-
ments is based on the utilitarian justification that confining the indi-
vidual is a means to achieve greater safety for society as a whole.185
Treating people as means to an end is generally seen as improper and
inconsistent with the full humanity of an individual.1s6
The question Schopp must answer is this: What is the theory un-
derlying the conclusion that it is permissible for CL-incompetent, but
not CL-competent, individuals to be treated as means to an end rather
than ends in themselves? Why is it permissible for incompetent peo-
ple to be confined when they do not "deserve" the confinement,
whereas competent people may not be?
Schopp, as I have suggested above, frames his theory in terms of
rights and status. Under this theory, diminished mental capacity
means diminished rights and status. Those who are CL-incompetent
are not entitled to be treated as full moral agents in the criminal sys-
tem; they are "relegated" to the civil system. Treating them as means
to an end is permissible because their rights are diminished and their
status as persons (or as diminished persons) is not insulted by this
treatment.1 s7
The alternate theory is an interest-based theory.1ss Under this
theory, the rights of the individual and her status remain unaffected
by mental impairment. The state's interests, in contrast, are differen-
tially affected by the mental competency of the individual. If, for
example, the individual's mental impairment forecloses criminal pros-
ecution, the state's interest in using the alternate system of social con-
trol (civil commitment) is heightened. The state cannot use the
alternate system for individuals without the requisite impairment be-
cause the state's interest is not heightened.
The first analysis, rights-based, is dangerous because it lacks prin-
cipled limitations. If mentally impaired individuals are entitled to
less and have fewer rights, they are in a sense only partial citizens. If
Modified Desert Model of Criminal Sentencing, 5 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 103
(1982)(discussing the use of prediction in sentencing).
185. Parens patriae commitments do not suffer from the same characteristic. In
parens patriae commitments, the confinement is a means to ends that are (at
least in theory) the individual's own, rather than the society's.
186. See Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37
Vm. L. REv. 1705, 1715 (1992). According to Winick,
Kant's theory asserts that individuals must be treated as persons capa-
ble of rational choices, as ends in themselves, rather than merely as
means to the achievement of others' ends. According to this view, there
is a natural, inalienable right to be treated as a person, as one whose
individual autonomy is respected.
Id.
187. See, e.g., Scu.., supra note 29, at 1 (quoting Lord Shaftesbury, Diaries, Sept. 5,
1851: "Madness constitutes a right, as it were, to treat people as vermin").
188. I develop this theory more fully in Janus, Preventing, supra note 5, at 208-12.
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their diminished status allows them to be treated as means to social
ends for some purposes, why not others? On the other hand, the inter-
est-based analysis is self-limiting. The state's interests are enhanced
only to the extent that its police power, otherwise exercisable in the
criminal law, is thwarted by the mental impairment.
As suggested above, Schopp's autonomy argument relies on the
rights/status approach. Schopp's discussion of "values convergence"
shows that the limits of police power commitments cannot be firmly
founded on this sort of approach. Schopp hopes to show that the
mental-status-based argument works for police power commitments
by analogizing it to parens patriae commitments. In the latter con-
text, Schopp convincingly shows that autonomy and well-being are
convergent when the civil commitment system is invoked involunta-
rily only for S-incompetent individuals, i.e., those who lack the capac-
ity to engage in autonomous action. This convergence arises because
well-being in this context is self-referential, and for that reason, the
concepts of autonomy and well-being are tied together. An individ-
ual's well-being consists in what he competently chooses for him-
self.189 Nonintervention in the lives of competent individuals thus
respects both autonomy and well-being. Parens patriae intervention,
on the other hand, respects autonomy because the individual is incom-
petent to exercise autonomy. Further, it enhances well-being because
its surrogate decisions are aimed at replacing the incompetent choices
about health care and other self-regarding matters. Note that the val-
ues of autonomy and well-being pull in the same direction. Interven-
tion increases well-being only to the extent that it respects the value
of autonomy.
Schopp hopes to show that social control commitments operate in a
parallel fashion. He argues that autonomy and well-being are values
that converge if CL-competence is the test that distributes individuals
to the criminal or mental health systems of social control. Here, of
course, he means societal well-being, not self-referential well-being.
Further, I take it he does not precisely mean "autonomy," but rather
the value of respecting responsibility for ones actions. The argument
works, but only if Schopp assumes as a premise the very conclusion
that is said to flow from the autonomy argument: the criminal law
and mental health systems must be nonoverlapping, i.e., any given set
of psychological impairments can justify the invocation of, at most,
one of them. If one makes this assumption, then the values of respon-
sibility and public well-being not only converge, but are maximized by
making CL-competency the sorting principle. One receives a maxi-
189. As Schopp states this point: "By exercising sovereignty, each competent person
defines and pursues those aspects of well-being that are central to the life he or
she has chosen." Schopp, supra note 5, at 175.
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mum amount of social control, and the respect for responsibility is
maximi ed.190
But now proceed without the assumption about nonoverlapping
systems. Let us assume, rather, that the question of the relationship
between the criminal and mental health system is to proceed from the
explication, not as a part of the explicandum. Under these circum-
stances, one could argue that the aggregate value would be maximized
through the use of the two systems seriatim. Seriatim use maximizes
the value of criminal responsibility by holding the CL-competent indi-
vidual responsible and then maximizes societal well-being by confin-
ing the individual in the mental health system until he is no longer
"dangerous."
This analysis shows that the use of the individual's diminished sta-
tus to justify the enhancement of society's well-being in police power
commitments is not a self-limiting system. There will be many cir-
cumstances in which society can maximize the well-being/autonomy
function by enhancing its own well-being, even at the expense of fur-
ther imposition on the individual.'91
In short, an analysis that looks only to the individual's status will
not result in limits on police power commitments. Such limits will
come only from an analysis founded upon an analysis of the state's
interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
Schopp, Winick, and many others are in basic agreement about the
limits on the state's power to use civil commitment for social control.
Mental disorder supports civil commitment only when it impairs fun-
damental psychological capacities like cognition and volition. Schopp
and Winick offer conceptual frameworks that incorporate philosophi-
cal and behavioral science principles into the fabric of this legal in-
190. Note that the synergistic effect is not as strong because the concepts of responsi-
bility (CIcompetence) and societal well-being are not connected in the same way
that autonomy and self-regarding well-being are. At most, there is a contingent
connection in the sense that the mental health system may make choices for the
individual that enhance her CL-competence; but such enhancement does not nec-
essarily translate into societal well-being.
191. In contrast, the parens patriae analysis produces a closed and self-limiting sys-
tem. The individual's diminished status (S-incompetence) justifies state inter-
vention aimed at enhancement of her own well-being. Intervention is adjusted to
maximize the individual's benefit, a formula that ought to limit the imposition on
the individual. Thus, in the parens patriae context, a rights/status analysis for
civil commitment produces limited intervention. But see ScuIL, supra note 29, at
313 (showing that such benign calculi rarely perform as promised). See also
Mary L. Durham & John Q. La Fond, supra note 41, at 887 (claiming to show that
therapeutically-derived criteria for commitment can have an outcome that is det-
rimental to individuals with mental illness).
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quiry. Their differences highlight the importance of choosing a
conceptual framework.
Winick chooses psychiatric hospitalization as his explicandum. He
seeks the limits of civil commitment from within itself. Psychiatric
hospitals are medical facilities, and from this observation the principle
of therapeutic appropriateness follows. Canvassing the medical and
behavioral science literature, Winick shows that the modern psychiat-
ric hospital is simply therapeutically inappropriate for individuals
with disorders, such as antisocial personality disorder, that are not
medically treatable. But his analysis cannot determine whether the
state might establish other sorts of institutions, and in so doing, ex-
pand the reach of its civil commitment power beyond psychiatric ill-
nesses. Winick's mastery of the medical discourse is a valuable
contribution. In the end, however, the structure of his explication re-
lies too much on science and not enough on law to set the limits on the
state's police power.
Schopp deploys philosophical analysis as masterfully as Winick
makes use of science. Schopp observes that civil commitment has two
aspects. He offers the insight that police power commitments and the
criminal law ought to be seen as two components of a comprehensive
system of social control. This helps us see that the bounds of police
power commitments may be derived from understanding its place in
the broader system. But Schopp applies a rights/status analysis to
derive the limits on the state's power to use civil commitment for so-
cial control. This analysis cannot, by itself, generate stable limits on
police power commitments.
I have proposed a third framework for analysis. As in Schopp's
analysis, police power civil commitment is defined in relation to the
criminal law. In my analysis, the "moral force" of the criminal justice
system depends on that system being the primary means for the state
to vindicate its social control interests. Civil commitment is limited
because it may fill only the interstices of the criminal law. Incompe-
tent individuals are subject to the civil commitment power not because
their mental impairments diminish their personhood or their rights,
but because the state's social control interests can be vindicated in no
other way. Subjecting competent individuals to police power commit-
ments would destroy the primacy, and thus the moral force, of the
criminal law.
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